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The conflicts happening around the Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional 
Isiboro­Sécure (TIPNIS) in Bolivia among the multiple and diverse stakeholders within 
it, cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between conflicting interests regarding a 
highway.  
A political analysis of the TIPNIS conflicts should be an analysis of how 
Modernity responds to different, opposed and complementary civilizational projects, 
stressing the relation between indigenous peoples, and the plurinational state in Bolivia; 
the present locus of the conflict. The plurinational state in Bolivia was formed with the 
express intention of dismantling the colonial and its civilizational order through the 
reformulation of the Bolivian State. 
By contrasting, comparing, dissecting and analyzing how notions of citizenship, 
nationhood, and civilization are deployed in Modernity, in one geographical place, the 
TIPNIS in Bolivia, and through different historical eras, we can elucidate how those 
notions were and are enforced. The civilization/nation/citizen membership and non-
membership, who fits and who doesn’t fit those categories, and how the movement 
 vii 
between them is managed, throw light on how Modernity’s project is carried away in 
everyday life, and under what costs.  
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Chapter 1  
1. OVERLAPPING 
It is scheduled that on the 25th of April 2012, the IX indigenous march for “la 
defensa de la vida y dignidad, los territorios indígenas, los recursos naturales, la 
biodiversidad, el medio ambiente y las áreas protegidas, cumplimiento de la Constitución 
Política del Estado y el respeto a la democracia” will depart towards La Paz, Bolivia’s 
capital, in order to contest Law No. 222 promulgated on the 10th of February 2012. This 
Law abrogates Law No. 180, enacted the 24th of October 2011, as part of the aftermath of 
the VIII Marcha Indígena por la Dignidad y el Territorio, which declared TIPNIS an 
intangible1 Indigenous Territory and National Park:  
“…se ratifica al Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS 
como territorio indígena de los pueblos Chimán, Yuracaré y Mojeño-trinitario, de 
carácter indivisible, imprescriptible, inenmbargable, inalienable e irreversible y 
como area protegida de interés nacional.”2 
Law 222 overturns Law No. 180 by decreeing a consultation process to define if:  
“1. Definir si el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS 
debe ser zona intangible o no, para viabilizar el desarrollo de las actividades de 
los pueblos indígenas Mojeño-Trinitario, Chimane y Yuracaré, así como la 
construcción de la Carretera Villa-Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos.  
2. Establecer las medidas de salvaguarda para la protección del Territorio 
Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS, así como las destinadas a la 
prohibición y desalojo inmediato de asentamientos ilegales respetando la línea 
demarcatoria del TIPNIS.”3 
                                                
1 “Unable to be touched or grasped; not having physical presence.” New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd 
edition, 2005.  
2 «Ley No. 180», Art. 1. 
3 «Ley No. 222», Art. 4. 
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The implementation of Law 222 by the Bolivian government implies that the IX 
march in defense of Law 180 and the consultation process initiated by the government 
will overlap: 
“Haciendo números, se ve que, en caso de que efectivamente se inicie la IX 
marcha indígena, los tiempos se cruzan al menos en lo que podría presumirse 
como el final de la movilización y el inicio de la consulta: anunciaron la partida 
de los marchistas para el 25 de abril, mientras que se proyectó que la consulta 
comenzaría el 15 de mayo. Si recordamos que la marcha del Consejo Indígena del 
Sur (Conisur) —efectuada en condiciones considerablemente favorables)— tardó 
44 días en llegar a La Paz y que el tiempo entre la IX marcha y la consulta previa 
es de 38 jornadas, entonces el desfase temporal hace suponer que, 
hipotéticamente, cuando la consulta previa comience a “caminar”, parte de los 
habitantes de las tierras del Isiboro Sécure estarán muy lejos de ellas (lo que 
tampoco significa que no puedan llegar de manera posterior).”4 
This overlap between the 2 events raises issues that go beyond the political strategies 
among interest groups. It is my intention to shine a light on the overlapping, 
contradictory, complimentary power relations among civilizational projects, in Bolivia 
today, in order to understand how Modernity is enforced, as an idea and an inescapable 
reality, since Modernity acts on concrete bodies, and is traceable, alive.  
Therefore, a political analysis of the TIPNIS conflicts should be an analysis of 
how Modernity responds to non-Modern projects, stressing the relation between 
indigenous peoples, and the Plurinational State in Bolivia; the present locus of the 
conflict. However, the Plurinational State in Bolivia was formed with the express 
intention of dismantling the colonial order through the articulation of non-Modern 
projects (i.e. indigenous people nations and nationalities, recognition of Afro-descendant 
status as “indigenous”, etc.). Therefore, an analysis of the Plurinational State and its 
relation to Modernity, becomes imperative as well.  
                                                
4 «Diagnóstico reservado para la consulta previa por el TIPNIS». 
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By contrasting, comparing, dissecting and analyzing how notions of citizenship, 
nationhood, and civilization are deployed in Modernity, in one geographical place 
(Bolivia) and through different historical eras, we can elucidate how those notions were 
enforced. The civilization/nation/citizen membership and non-membership, who fits and 
who doesn’t fit those categories, and how the movement between them is managed, 
throw light on how Modernity’s project is carried away in everyday life, and under what 
costs.  
One of the salient features of the TIPNIS conflicts is that multiple interests are at 
stake, interests that are not locally or nation bound, but internationally. Brazil 
government, through a private company, OAS, has invested in the highway project that 
would connect Brazil and Chile, expanding commercial relations in the region. At the 
same time, the highway, which would cross the TIPNIS, is inscribed on the regional 
agenda of integrating South Americas’ infrastructure. In the year 2000, the Iniciativa 
para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IRSA) was developed 
and rattified by twelve South American Countries, Bolivia among them, with the main 
objective of: “…avanzar en la modernización de la infraestructura regional y en la 
adopción de acciones específicas para promover su integración y desarrollo económico y 
social...”5 Local, national and global interests collide on the TIPNIS.  
Therefore the TIPNIS conflict, as a different kind of conflict in which different 
types of tools by different stakeholders are deployed brings forth questions worth asking 
since they address the lives, and explains sometimes the deaths, of flesh and bone human 
beings. There are questions that arise from the direct confrontation, in Bolivia’s current 
historical scenario: how does the Plurinational State, as opposed as the former 
                                                
5 «IIRSA». 
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Colonial/Republican/Neoliberal Bolivian State deal with marginalized subjects? How do 
the multiple interests at stake shape the conflict? On the other hand, questions regarding 
Modernity, as the current global project at work, and how it works, should be addressed 
as well. How does Modernity enforce its project? Are anti-modern projects possible 
within Modernity?  
2. INTERNAL COLONIALISM AS A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In his inauguration speech as Bolivia’s first indigenous president Evo Morales 
first words were: 
“Para recordar a nuestros antepasados por su intermedio señor presidente del 
Congreso Nacional, pido un minuto de silencio para Manco Inca, Tupaj Katari, 
Tupac Amaru, Bartolina Sisa, Zárate Villca, Atihualqui Tumpa, Andrés Ibáñez, 
Ché Guevara, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Luis Espinal, a muchos de mis 
hermanos caídos, cocaleros de la zona del trópico de Cochabamba, por los 
hermanos caídos en la defensa de la dignidad del pueblo alteño, de los mineros, de 
miles, de millones de seres humanos que han caído en toda América y por ellos 
presidente pido un minuto de silencio. (As he finisished these words, a pututu6 
was heard in the National Congress.) ¡Gloria a los mártires por la liberación!”  
A lot of lessons can be drawn from these first words and sounds. The Bolivian 
Congress sound space, what was commonly heard, was torn. The political disruption of 
the Institutional territory, through the enunciation of names and through the production of 
certain kinds of sounds, was Morales’ first act as an Indigenous president. Luis Cárcamo-
Huechante analyses the question of social sound spaces, and how these, as any other 
territory, are sites of contention. For Cárcamo-Huechante, Wixage anai!, an autonomous 
Mapuche radio station in Chile, brings forth the importance of being present and being 
visible, and in the case of the radio, audible. The presence of the Mapuche voices through 
                                                
6 “Instrumento de viento, hecho de cuerno o asta del ganado vacuno, que empleamos (the Aymaras and 
Quechuas) para la Guerra y para los principales tumultos comunitarios como señal de emergencia, cuando 
nos encontramos en peligro.” (Quispe 1990: P. 22)   
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the radio waves helps create a new territory without a physical location. Listening to the 
radio, therefore, becomes a political act, an activist one, that creates a common territory 
for the Mapuches, rural and urban, bridging them in an autonomous zone.  
“…la audiencia mapuche urbana que sigue el progama radial semanalmente debe 
ejercer un “compromiso” de escuchar, hecho que, en tanto expresión de voluntad 
comunitaria e individual, da cuenta de una acción política: el acto de escuchar el 
programa radial, aun siendo margen en el margen, ya pone de manifiesto una 
voluntad política de audición.”7 
This political commitment, in the Wixage anai! experience (as well as in the 
Mapuche, and the experiences of all subaltern subjects?) comes from the price of 
defending indigenous autonomy from the elites. We don’t have to go that far, in the case 
of Wixage anai!, autonomy meant sacrificing coverage in order to maintain freedom of 
creation and content: “Asimismo, habría que volver a señalar que este programa radial 
mapuche sale al aire a través de Radio Tierra, una emisora que, en su carácter alternativo, 
posee una cobertura limitada en el dial.”8 Different territories, in this case the sound 
space, same power inertia: the dispossession of the other(s) autonomic territories, 
annulling self-government possibilities.  
Likewise the pututu that ripped the Bolivian congress sound space, the names that 
Evo Morales asked to be honored and remembered, and the Indigenous person that 
embodied it all, disrupted the longstanding Bolivian status quo.  
It is important to map the names Morales called because they are at the matrix of 
the whole identity which was generated, actualized, transformed and used from the year 
2000 to the approval of the new Bolivian Constitution in 2009, which brought with it the 
reformulation of Bolivia as a Pluri-national State in order to de-colonize Bolivia. This 
identity is a mixture of “memories” of past Bolivian exploitation experiences and stories. 
                                                
7 Cárcamo-Huechante, «Voces mapuches en el airte», 8. 
8 Ibid. 
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We find basically three periods of time, which evoke three different experiences, which 
mixed and fused early in the year 2000 into a novel one that, served to take the State 
through democratic elections in 2005. 
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui describes these three different experiences as cycles: 
Colonial, Liberal and Populist. Each of these experiences or cycles brought different 
exploitation relations into the “Bolivian” political reality. Broadly speaking, the Colonial 
cycle brought the ethnic cleavage, the Liberal cycle (1825 to 1952) brought the 
affirmation of the individual through the citizenry, and the Populist cycle in which the 
State assumes the role of a centralizing-homogenizing agent by introducing parameters 
such as development and underdevelopment in a National logic In summary, the 
invention of the Bolivian Nation.  
Table 1 Names Mentioned in Morales' address by type of "experience" 
Colonial Experience Liberal Experience Populist Experience 
•Manco Inca  
•Tupaj Katari  
•Tupac Amaru  
•Bartolina Sisa 
•Zárate Villaca  
•Atihualqui Tumpa  
•Andrés Ibáñez 
 
•Ché Guevara  
•Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz 
•Luis Espinal  
•Coca leaf peasants 
•Pueblo Alteño (El Alto urban   
indigenous dwellers) 
• Miners 
With all of these in mind, Evo’s address to the Congress is more than a political 
statement; it’s a political strategy, a kind of public policy in which imaginaries are re-
ordered, hence re-evaluated and re-introduced to the everyday Bolivian symbols 
repertoire (Table 1).  
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Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, the Aymara-European Bolivian sociologist, positions 
herself as a chi’ixi: “…considero a ésta la traducción más adecuada de la mezcla 
abigarrada que somos las y los llamados mestizos. La palabra chi’ixi tiene diversas 
connotaciones: es un color producto de la yuxtaposición, en pequeños puntos o manchas, 
de dos colores opuestos o contrastados…(emphasis mine) ”9 Abigarrado becomes a key 
concept used by Cusicanqui to describe a series of feautures that result from Bolivia’s 
colonial, republican and neoliberal past: “La noción de chi’ixi,…, equivale a la de 
“sociedad abigarrada” de Zavaleta, y plantea la coexistencia en paralelo de multiples 
diferencias culturales que no se funden, sino que antagonizan o se complementan. Cada 
una se reproduce a sí misma desde la profundidad del pasado y se relaciona con las otras 
de forma contenciosa.”10 (Emphasis mine) Just as Cusicanqui does, Luis Tapia argues 
that:  
“…Bolivia, en su acepción más amplia, no es una sociedad sino el nombre 
histórico de un país que contiene una diversidad de sociedades en situación de 
dominación más o menos colonial. Se podría decir que en una perspectiva más 
restringida es el nombre de la sociedad dominante, aunque se trate más bien de la 
historia de esta conflictiva articulación de desigualdades y formas de 
superposición desarticulada. Esto es lo que Zavaleta designaba como lo 
abigarrado. Bolivia es lo abigarrado, la existencia de una sociedad dominante, que 
a su vez es subalterna en lo mundial, que se superpone a las sociedades y culturas 
locales, que son articuladas parcialmente, de manera intermitente, en condiciones 
de desigualdad y explotación.”11 (Emphasis mine) 
We can draw from the concept of abigarrado two principal characteristics of 
Bolivia: 1) the coexistence of different civilizations amidst 2) contentious relations.  
                                                
9 Rivera Cusicanqui, Ch’ixinakax Utxiwa, 69. 
10 Ibid., 70. 
11 Tapia Mealla, Política Salvaje, 36. 
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These two trends are implicit in what Pablo González Casanova defined as 
Internal Colonialism. In his book Sociología de la Explotación, the Mexican sociologist 
establishes the objectives of his work as the following:  
“El libro está escrito sobre todo para los estudiantes de América Latina y de 
aquellos países que han adoptado el falso rigor empirista, tan estrechamente 
asociado a las ciencias sociales predominantes hoy en Estados Unidos. También 
esta escrito para quienes se quedan en los slogans y las palabras pomposas del 
marxismo ortodoxo y dogmático, renunciando a las grandes tradiciones que el 
propio marxismo tiene de investigación científica de alto nivel…”12 
This colonial epistemic project, for the author, is embedded in the political, 
overarching project: “el juego de las distintas formas de explotación del hombre por el 
hombre, de las clases y el colonialismo.”13 Exploitation becomes central in his analysis, 
but its articulation in society varies along civilizations. While Lenin, through his analysis 
of Capital and Imperialism, described exploitation, and colonialism, as a social class 
conflict, revealing his colonizer/European/Eurocentric/male positionality, González 
Casanova observes that the contradiction, the contentious arena of colonialism, is not 
class, but the civilizational projects confronted since the “meeting of two worlds”.  
“El colonialismo interno corresponde a una estructura de relaciones sociales de 
dominio y explotación entre grupos culturales heterogéneos, distintos. Si alguna 
diferencia específica tiene respecto de otras relaciones de dominio y explotación 
(ciudad –campo, clases sociales) es la heterogeneidad cultural que históricamente 
produce la conquista de unos pueblos por otros, y que permite hablar no sólo de 
diferencias culturales (que existen entre la población urbana y rural y en las clases 
sociales) sino de diferencias de civilización.”14 
Hence, the “political” in the Colonial project is shaped in the contention among 
civilizations. Race, obviously, becomes a fundamental tool in this modern project:  
                                                
12 González Casanova, Sociología De La Explotación, 11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 198. 
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“Es bien sabido que el racismo y la discriminación racial son el legado de la 
historia universal de la conquista de unos pueblos por otros…El racismo aparece 
en todas la colonias donde se encuentran dos culturas…El racismo y la 
segregación racial son esenciales a la explotación colonial, de unos pueblos por 
otros…El racismo y la discriminación corresponden a la psicología y la política 
típicamente coloniales.”15  
But race, and racism, doesn’t emerge as independent structures, on the contrary, 
they depend on the civilizational project underway, therefore its articulation in society 
varies. The contention among civilizations, therefore, will bring forth different 
articulations of race, class, gender, region, etc. in the diverse colonial setups, articulating 
a hierarchical ordered setup.  
Rivera Cusicanqui, echoing González Casanova points that:  
“…tanto la identidad india, como la identidad mestiza, y la misma identidad 
q’ara, eran identidades forjadas en el marco estructurante del hecho colonial. 
Quiero decir con ello que los elementos raciales que estas identidades pueden 
exhibir, son secundarios frente al hecho de que son identidades definidas a través 
de su mutua oposición, en el plano cultural-civilizatorio, en torno a la polaridad 
básica entre culturas nativas y cultura occidental, que desde 1532 hasta nuestros 
días continúa moldeando los modos de convivencia y las estructuras de habitus 
(Bourdieu 1976) vigentes en nuestra sociedad.”16 (Emphasis mine) 
Internal Colonialism refers to the contention among civilizations, which spawns a: 
“…estructura jerárquica en la que se ubican los diversos estamentos de la sociedad a 
partir de la posición que ocupan en la apropiación de los medios de poder…”17  
The analytical tool of Internal Colonialism becomes relevant since it brings forth 
the “original” contradiction through which the exploitation relations throughout society 
are structured and hierarchized in Latin America. Since an opposition among civilizations 
lies at the bottom of the contradiction, all the other contradictions introduced through the 
                                                
15 Ibid., 195. 
16 Violencias Encubiertas En Bolivia, 57. 
17 Ibid. 
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different cycles of Bolivia’s history, all the other exploitation experiences, get articulated 
around this very first opposition.  
3. RACE: A DEMOBILIZING IDEA 
On the other hand, Aníbal Quijano, describes the colonial project as one in which 
“Uno de los ejes fundamentales de ese patrón de poder es la clasificación social de la 
población mundial sobre la idea de raza, una construcción mental que expresa la 
experiencia básica de la dominación colonial…”18 (Emphasis mine) Race, hence, is what 
orders the colonial experience:  
“La formación de relaciones sociales fundadadas en dicha idea (raza), produjo en 
América identidades sociales históricamente nuevas…Y en la medida en que las 
relaciones sociales que estaban configurándose eran relaciones de dominación, 
tales identidades fueron asociadas a las jerarquías, lugares y roles sociales 
correspondientes, como constitutivas de ellas y en consecuencia, al patrón de 
dominación colonial que se imponía. En otros términos, raza e identidad racial 
fueron establecidas como instrumentos de clasificación social básica de la 
población.”19 
Race becomes the idea through which new identities are created, i.e. indigenous, 
yellow, blacks; therefore racism structures and orders society based on phenotypical 
traits. Race, and racism, skin color, becomes the standard for organizing the colonies and 
their exploitation. There is no consideration, in Quijano’s account, of the pre-existing 
Nations/Civilizations in the hemisphere, prior to the arrival of the Spaniards. 
Colonization, therefore, just orders the bodies based on phenotype. “De ese modo, raza se 
convirtió en el primer criterio fundamental para la distribución de la población mundial 
en rangos, lugares y roles en la estructura de poder de la nueva sociedad. En otros 
                                                
18 La Colonialidad Del Saber, 201. 
19 Ibid., 202. 
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términos, en el modo básico de clasificación social universal de la población mundial.”20 
Race structures the subaltern experience, and from within, other sources of exploitation 
are incorporated, such as the racial organization of labor and racial organization of gender 
and sex relations. Therefore, racial control, and racial classification becomes, for the 
author, the contentious arena where “the political” is settled.  
4. INTERNAL COLONIALISM AND RACE IN THE MIRROR 
The political, practical, consequences of both accounts could be drawn from the 
political projects which Internal Colonialism and Race suggest. The analysis elaborated 
in 1978 by the Movimiento Indio Tojil 21 draws on the concept of Internal Colonialism 
when it asserts that Guatemala is not a Nation, but a society. “En el seno de la sociedad 
guatemalteca coexiste una pluralidad de naciones entre quienes encontramos las naciones 
tradicionales… y una nación potencial surgida por y en el hecho colonial..(la nación 
ladina dominante).”22 Hence, “…se puede decir que de hecho, la “nación gutemalteca”, 
no existe ni existirá para nadie, ni para los indios, ni para los ladinos…”23 Therefore, 
Colonialism and the project of Internal Colonialism, is structured in terms of the 
contention between nations (civilizations), being in the Guatemalan case, the different 
indigenous nations and the ladino-mestizo nation.  
“…además de ser comunidades de historia, lengua y cultura, poseían gobierno 
propio…Cada nación disponía también de su territorio delimitado geográfica y 
linguísticamente. A la llegada de los españoles, estas naciones fueron expropiadas 
de sus territorios respectivos, fueron desmanteladas de sus estructuras políticas 
administrativas, embestidas en cuanto a sus características culturales y destruidas 
                                                
20 Ibid., 203. 
21 The “mythical” Tojil movement could be a:”…colectivo que va cambiando de nombre e imagen para 
sobrevivir en la clandestinidad de un entorno cada vez más represivo…”  In “La (ausencia de) demanda 
autonómica en Guatemala” by Santiago Bastos.  
22 Tojil, «Guatemala De La República Burguesa Centralista a La República Federal», 1. 
23 Ibid., 3. 
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en su vida económica. Es decir que dejaron de ser naciones autónomas para 
convertirse en naciones colonizadas y explotadas.”24  
If the contention is among nations/civilizations, therefore a whole new realm of 
political action is revealed.  
By denying the nationhood of the civilizations in the “New World”, race becomes 
the tag in which all the others, i.e. non-Europeans, were bundled. Race is a consequence 
of the Colonial project, a key difference with Quijano for whom racism is the project: 
“Porque la discrminación solo es la valorización de las diferencias reales o 
imaginarias de tipo social, cultural y biológico en provecho del ladino, mientras 
que la colonización es el fenómeno global de la explotación y opresión 
económica, política, cultural y military del pueblo indio en manos de la burguesía 
de la comunidad ladina. Además, cabe preguntarse, ¿cómo podrían resolver la 
cuestión de la discriminación racial antes de resolver el colonialismo interno?”25 
Therefore racism is not the project, colonialism is. Race by itself, in the Colonial 
enterprise, could lead to a struggle, which doesn’t overturn Internal Colonialism, the 
relations of exploitation among civilizations. By reducing colonialism to racism 
indigenous nationhood/civilization with their agency, culture, history, politics, 
economics, culture, memories, etc. are downplayed. “Las identidades nacionales son los 
únicos resultados naturales y permanentes de toda la evolución de la histórica de la 
humanidad, y los únicos divisores naturales de la especie humana en grupos de hombres. 
Porque si no fuera así, ya hubiera sido fácil integrar a los indios, como fácil debería de 
ser el de-indianizar a los ladinos.”26 That’s why Tojil analysts conclude that the concept 
of race doesn’t work in Guatemala: “…el concepto de raza no funciona (ni en Guatemala 
ni en ninguna parte del mundo).”27 
                                                
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
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Since Tojil analysts and Quijano depart from different starting points 
(Nations/Civilizations v. Racism), the political projects diverge. Tojl proposes a Federal 
Republic in which all Nations (in the beginning for strategic reasons, all indigenous 
nations will coalesce in one Pan-Indigenous Identity, hence bringing forth an Indigenous 
Nation) Indigenous and Ladino are recognized, addressing the Pluri-National character of 
Guatemala:  
“…la solución federalista es la única solución viable porque además de significar 
igualdad de derechos y poderes entre las comunidades India y ladina es la única 
que concuerda relativamente con los lineamientos del proyecto político indio 
contemporáneo, obliga a los ladinos a asumirse y comportarse como nación 
pueblo sin necsidad de indianizarse.”28 
 The federalist solution seeks to harmonize the relations among Nations within 
Guatemala, without bringing forth a Mestizo Nation, or a Chapin Nation, or a third other 
Nation (the melting pot project). Pluri-Nationhood, if taken seriously, becomes the first 
step in order to decolonize societies (i.e. Guatemalan society), and liberate exploited 
nations.  
On the other hand, and since racism is at the crux of Quijano’s argument, his 
political project comprises other traits. Quijano appeals to democracy, and 
democratization, as the vehicle of incorporation of the subalterns (of the other races). “En 
términos de la cuestión nacional, sólo a través de ese proceso de democratización de la 
sociedad puede ser posible y finalmente exitosa la construcción de un Estado-nación 
moderno, con todas sus implicancias, incluyendo ciudadanía y la representación 
política.”29 Therefore, for the Peruvian sociologist, democracy, through its deliberative 
mechanisms, could make all persons equal, at least politically. This democracy, at the 
end, should be able to return to the people the: “…control sobre el trabajo/ recursos/ 
                                                
28 Ibid., 18. 
29 La Colonialidad Del Saber, 241. 
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productos, sobre el sexo/ recursos/ productos, sobre la autoridad/ instituciones/ violencia, 
y sobre la intersubjetividad/ conocimiento/ comunicación…”30  
Walter Mignolo, takes on this definition of modernity (“La globalización en curso 
es, en primer término, la culminación de un proceso que comenzó con la constitución de 
América y la del capitalismo colonial/moderno y eurocentrado como un nuevo patrón de 
poder mundial.”31) to craft his Decolonial project: “Now, when Anibal (sic) Quijano 
introduced the concept of coloniality, and suggested disengaging and delinking from 
Western epistemology, he conceived that project as decolonization; decoloniality became 
an epistemic and political project.”32 (Emphasis mine) 
What are the epistemic and political projects within the modernity/coloniality 
academic tradition? Since colonialism is founded on a mental construction, an idea, then 
what matters is changing, substituting, replacing and challenging that idea: “En 
consecuencia, es tiempo de aprender a liberarnos del espejo eurocéntrico donde nuestra 
imagen es siempre, necesariamente, distorsionada. Es tiempo, en fin, de dejar de ser lo 
que no somos.”33 Ideas, since its ultimate bearers are individuals, should be discarded by 
each one of us. Each of us, under Quijano’s formula, should throw away the “made in 
Europe” mirror, making it appropriate to ask: who’s mirror should we buy, install, use, 
and believe next? This is when the modernity/coloniality theorist come handy, as 
Mignolo himself points out: “Decoloniality means decolonial options confronting and 
delinking from coloniality, or the colonial matrix of power…and it is an option claiming 
its legitimacy among existing academic projects, such as postcoloniality, ethnic studies, 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 201. 
32 Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity, XXV. 
33 La Colonialidad Del Saber, 242. 
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gender studies, the social sciences and the humanities…”34 Therefore, Decolonial 
mirrors, made in Academia, become available to all of us, to de-link us for our 
Eurocentric image.  
Hence, the Decolonial project, inaugurated by Quijano, and offered as an option 
by Mignolo renders invisible salient issues, by depoliticizing the subalterns’ agenda and 
by presenting the colonial experience as an epistemic problem (a mirror/idea). At the 
same time, positions academia as a necessary vanguard for us to decolonize ourselves. 
Here it is important to address again the definition that González Casanova made 
of Internal Colonialism as a system structured among civilizations. These civilizations, 
with their own structures, never cese to be. If they did, America would too, as an 
ontological subject. Hence, the colonial experience has never been an option for the 
colonial subjects. The political is thus the epistemological; the colonized subjects 
suffered colonialism, not as an idea, but in the flesh. Whether the oppressed subjects 
rationalized their oppression, i.e. saw themselves in the mirror and saw the distorted 
reflection from it, or not, colonialism is enforced. Regardless of what Quijano, Mignolo 
or myself think about the “idea” through which colonized subjects have been oppressed, 
it is oppression, and colonial subjects can’t avoid experiencing it.  
In Mignolo’s account of coloniality, the colonial matrix as an epistemic 
framework, helps us shine a light on how Knowledge, Race, Economy and Authority are 
intermingled and structured in the colonial experience.  
“…(T)he colonial matrix is built and operates on a series of interconnected 
heterogenous historico-structural nodes, bounded by the “/” that divides and 
unites modernity/coloniality, imperial laws/colonial rules, center/peripheries, that 
are the consequences of global linear thinking in the foundation of the 
modern/colonial world.”35 
                                                
34 Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity, XXVII. 
35 Ibid., 17. 
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The “/”, i.e. the bound36, is suspiciously forgotten in the rest of Mignolo’s 
argument. What is the “/” in his argument? My opinion is that the “/” device echoes 
Quijano’s “mirror”. By defining the colonial experience as an idea, they shift the place 
where coloniality (colonialism) is experienced. If  “/” is the mirror, then the bodies, the 
flesh and bone colonial experience is silenced. Colonialism is not interconnected through 
“nodes” bounded by “/”; colonialism is interconnected through the bodies of flesh and 
bone human beings who are the subjects of colonial power. Some, not all, human beings’ 
bodies, lives, experiences, and hence their agency, are relegated by this account of 
modernity.  
Modernity is structured around the bodies of the colonized subjects, it is in the 
flesh and bone of the subaltern subject that colonialism materializes. Before the idea of 
subjection, there was the direct and real confrontation of civilizations, in which the “/” - 
the “bound”- , the bodies, experienced in flesh the colonial project.  
Therefore, for the theorists of modernity/coloniality, it’s easy to render invisible 
subjects such as Fausto Reinga. Mignolo quotes Reinaga in order to structure his critique 
on the “traditional Marxist-left” tradition: “…Reinaga despised the Bolivian Left of his 
time, whose interests were closer to those of the ruling elite and less concerned with 
Indians. Indeed, the Bolivian Left did not see Indians. They saw peasants and workers.”37 
But, Mignolo doesn’t consider relevant to address Reinaga’s overall hatred. In the 
preface to the Manifest of the Indigenous Bolivian Party, Reinaga states that:  
“Es un Manifiesto de una raza, de un pueblo, de una Nación; de una cultura 
oprimida y silenciada…En tanto Manifiesto del PIB, plantea la Revolución India 
contra la “civiliazación” occidental.  
                                                
36 “A territorial limit; a boundary” 
37 Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity, XXIX. 
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El Manifiesto Indio, no es un documento que trata de la formación y propósitos de 
un partido político por venir; el PIB no es una “idea pura”; es un ser: ser social, 
vale decir, hecho vital.”38 (Emphasis Mine) 
Reinaga assumes his struggle against Western civilization as an existent, factual 
and social reality in the making. Couldn’t we argue that the Bolivian left, which Reinaga 
indeed bitterly critiqued, was also an outcome of the civilizational project? 
Therefore, Reinaga’s political agenda should be addressed as anti-civilizational 
one, with implications not only for the indigenous:  
“Los Indios sí que sabemos, cómo vamos a gastar nuestra “gran fuerza”. Vamos a 
gastar en la lucha por la conquista del Poder. El poder para edificar una nueva 
sociedad, una nueva “naturaleza humana”, un Nuevo Hombre, major que el que 
ha hecho el Occidente…El indianismo es el instrumento ideológico y politico de 
la Revolución del Tercer Mundo.”39 
When Mignolo sees colonialism structured in “nodes” bounded by “/” mirrors in 
the colonial reality, Reinaga sees Western civilization being enforced throughout the 
Americas through different strategies, that yield different outcomes:  
“Al liberarse la Nación India, libera a Bolivia: la nación opresora. Por tanto la 
Revolución India tiene jurado propósito: abatir al cholaje cipayo blanco-mestizo y 
al imperialismo de las “fieras rubias” de EE.UU. y Europa. 
En el proceso de la lucha a la discrimanación racial del blanco, responderemos 
con nuetro odio racial de cuatro siglos; a la opresión clasista del capital, 
responderemos como clase explotada; y a la segregación cultural responderemos 
enarbolando muy en alto nuestra maravillosa cultura milenaria.”40 
Of course, Reinaga’s account of whiteness has always been taken as literal, since, 
probably, metaphor, and in-between writing, is for the better, which most of the times are 
in the Academia. For example, Arturo Escobar, a distinguished member of Mignolo’s 
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Latin American modernity/coloniality research program, the “/” club, stated regarding 
“whiteness” that:  
“Beyond this more empirical observation, however, lies the fact that imperial 
globality is also about the defense of white privilege world-wide. By white 
privilege here I mean, not so much phenotypically white, but a Eurocentric way of 
life that has historically privileged white people at the expense of non-European 
and coloured peoples world-wide-and particularly since the 1950s those around 
the world who abide by this outlook. As we will see, this dimension of imperial 
globality is better drawn out through the concept of global coloniality.”41 
The “/” club naming and ordering the knowledge through the colonial matrix, 
hence ordering the political (in)action; the idea preceding the fact. 
The political, the power relations among colonized and colonizers, is held in the 
opposition between civilizations and their contentious projects. Internal colonialism as 
opposed to the coloniality of power offers a framework in which oppression, exploitation, 
and the ordering of the bodies is structured around a civilizational model where White 
represents not only a physical bodily characteristic, but a project in which race, sex and 
gender, ethnicity, knowledge, spirituality, economy, politics, etc., is structured. Internal 
Colonialism, as well, accounts for the agency of the subaltern Nations, in the resistance to 
the Colonial project, since the “political” is not only an individual struggle, but a 
Nation/Civilization one.  Violence, experienced in the flesh by humans, is structured in 
Modernity through the establishment of the Colonizer civilizational project. Redressing 
individuals, although necessary (as in the case of race reparations) is important, but 
doesn’t erase the source of that violence. Redressing colonialism means the liberation of 
the Others, hence, their possibility of existence as Others.  
                                                
41 Escobar, «Beyond the Third World», 216. 
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5. GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT REPARATIONS 
Reparation is a commonly used, and abused, term in the U.S. government- Native 
American Nations relations. Most of the time, reparations are understood as monetary 
compensations, being the Claims Settlement Act of 2010, in the United States, is an 
example of this: “This bill also provides funding for settlements reached in four separate 
water rights suits brought by Native American tribes, and it represents a significant step 
forward in addressing the water needs of Indian Country.”42 Through this act, the U.S. 
government seeks to redress two historically discriminated groups, Native Americans and 
African Americans. This redress stems from legal claims against the U.S. government, in 
which both groups sued the state for different reasons, in the case of Native Americans, 
through the mismanagement of Tribal funds, making Barack Obama conclude: “And 
now, after 14 years of litigation, it’s finally time to address the way that Native 
Americans were treated by their government.  It’s finally time to make things right.”43 
Redress and reparation, have become the domesticated way in which governments 
address their “debts” with subaltern subjects; hence, a closer look to these concepts 
becomes critical. What is the logic behind redress and reparation? Redress means, when 
used as a verb, to remedy or set right, while reparation is “the making of amends for a 
wrong one has done, by paying money to or otherwise helping those who have been 
wronged.”44 Both terms are related in that they both imply the will of the offender, the 
wrongdoer, to do well. Hence, the offender, through a conscious and voluntarily act, sets 
right his offense with the offended. Redress and reparation, in the case not of personal 
                                                
42 «Statement by the President on House Passage of the Claims Settlement Act of 2010 | The White 
House». 
43 «Obama Signs Bill Setting Aside Another $1.15 Billion to Pay Discrimination Compensation to Tens of 
Thousands of Black Farmers | CNSNews.com». 
44 New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd edition. 
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relations, but of State-to-State or State-individual relations develop in a different relation. 
In the former, redress through reparation can be accomplished since both Nations survive 
the action to repair (tax exemptions, for example, could only be given in a certain 
territory, to an established and visible society, i.e. with political organization and 
bureaucrats). But, in the latter case, how does reparation occur when the individual is no 
longer a part, sometimes as a direct effect of the violent act to redress, of a Nation, a 
State, a group, a community, etc.? 
For Andrea Smith reparations must call into question, if taken seriously, the 
capitalist and colonial status quo. “If we think about reparations less in terms of financial 
compensation for social oppression and more about a moment to transform the neo-
colonial economic relations between the U.S. and people of colour, Indigenous peoples 
and Third World countries, we see how critical this movement could be to all of us.”45 
Therefore, on the limit, redress and reparation have to contest the sources of violence(s) 
in the colonial experiences.  
Modernity brings violence to those flesh and blood subjects that don’t fit its 
project; thus there cannot be a one-size-fits-all colonial experience:  
“In my activist work, I have often heard the sentiment expressed in Indian 
country: we don not have time to address sexual/domestic violence in our 
communities because we have to work on “survival issues first”. However, Indian 
women suffer death rates twice as high as any other women in this country 
because of domestic violence.”46  
Hence, decolonization has to address those different experiences as well, for 
example sexism and male domination, since they are essential components of the 
Colonial project that modernity puts forth, not just its collateral effects.  
                                                
45 Making Space for Indigenous Feminism, 103. 
46 Ibid., 98. 
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“It has been through sexual violence and through the imposition of European 
gender relationships on Native communities that Europeans were able to colonize 
Native peoples in the first place. If we maintain these patriarchal gender systems, 
we will be unable to decolonize and fully assert our sovereignty.”47 
Therefore, decolonization, in the U.S. experience, becomes a twofold force: 1) 
decolonization calls for the recognition of the Indigenous Nations, its territory and 
autonomy and, 2) decolonization as the critical revision of the meaning, representation, 
and implementation the of Nation: “Before Native peoples fight for the future of their 
nations, they must ask themselves, who is included in the nation?”48  
Decolonization for Smith, at the limit, becomes the vehicle through which 
modernity, and its violence against the subaltern subjects is questioned and contested. If, 
reparation and decolonization are taken seriously, addressing the multiple forms of 
exploitation that the Western civilizational project enacted such as race, gender, class, 
ethnicity, etc., must be contested.  
“Thus by making anti-colonial struggle central to feminist politics, Native women 
make central to their organizing the question of what is the appropriate form of 
governance for the world in general. Does self-determination for Indigenous 
peoples equal aspirations for a nation state, or are there other forms of governance 
we can create that are not based on domination and control?”49 
Decolonization becomes an acting framework with a twofold purpose, what on 
Smith’s account feminist groups such as Sista II Sista’s strategy is: “taking power” and 
“making power”.  
“On the one hand it is necessary to engage in oppositional politics to corporate 
and state power (taking power). However, if we only engage in politics of taking 
power, we will have a tendency to replicate the hierarchical structures in our 
movements. Consequently, it is also important to make power by creating those 
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structures within our organizations, movements and communities that model the 
world we are trying to create.”50 
Deborah A. Thomas proposes reparations as a framework for thinking in order to 
focus on the structure of the colonial societies, in modernity, rather than their cultures as 
source of inequalities among people. This re-thinking, at the limit, would re-think 
categories such as citizenship and sovereignty, therefore of who fits and who doesn’t a 
particular project:  
“…we might be moved to apprehend citizenship as a set of performances and 
practices directed at various state and non-state institutions or extraterritorial or 
extralegal networks –networks that are global, national, regional, and local- over 
time. This reorientation would require that we tease out the various ways in which 
the regulatory, disciplinary, biopolitical, and distributional practice of 
governments throughout the Americas (and beyond) have often been suffused 
with and enacted by extra-state, non-state, or quasi-legal entities.”51 (Emphasis 
mine) 
“Reparations” as a framework for thinking, as opposed to Mignolo’s coloniality 
matrix, is structured around flesh and bone colonial experiences.  
6. THE PLURI-NATIONAL BET 
In the Preamble of Bolivia’s 2009 approved constitution, it is stated that:  
“El pueblo boliviano, de composición plural, desde la profundidad de la 
historia,… construimos un nuevo Estado. Un Estado basado en el respeto e 
igualdad entre todos, con principios de soberanía, dignidad, complementariedad, 
solidaridad, armonía y equidad en la distribución y redistribución del producto 
social, donde predomine la búsqueda del vivir bien; con respeto a la pluralidad 
económica, social, jurídica, política y cultural de los habitantes de esta tierra;… 
Dejamos en el pasado el Estado colonial, republicano y neoliberal. Asumimos el 
reto histórico de construir colectivamente el Estado Unitario Social de Derecho 
Plurinacional Comunitario, que integra y articula los propósitos de avanzar hacia 
una Bolivia democrática, productiva, portadora e inspiradora de la paz, 
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comprometida con el desarrollo integral y con la libre determinación de los 
pueblos…(Emphasis mine)”52 
We can read in Bolivia’s constitution statement of purpose two principal goals: 1) 
dismantling the Colonial-Republican-Neoliberal State, the form in which was articulated 
the contentious relationship between the different civilizations within the Bolivian State, 
and 2) the construction of a new State, the Plurinational State, in which the contentious 
nature of the abigarrada society is sorted out through the self-determination of the 
nations (pueblos). Hence, we can observe two creative forces being unleashed: one, 
which I define as the dissolvent agenda, i.e. disentangling the opposition of civilizations, 
destroying the structures and mechanisms that support the domination of one among 
others. On the other hand, by constructing a new State, the Plurinational State, a new 
hegemony is put forth, and a new solidifying (as opposed to dissolvent) agenda is 
incarnated in the construction of the new State. Therefore dissecting who we are, and for 
what purposes is necessary to analyze the political, the power relations within 
civilizations. 
7. WHO “WE” ARE, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSES? 
Discipline, for Foucault, comes from the combination of three types of 
relationships: power as an action that is exerted over things and gives the ability to 
modify, use, consume and destroy them (finalized activities), power as a mean to bring 
forth relations between individuals, or between groups (power relations), and finally 
power as systems of communication (production and distribution of meaning). These 
three types of power should not be considered as three separate domains nor as a system 
with fixed equilibriums in which the three forms of power are equally exercised. Hence, 
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the question about power shifts from its nature, to its form. How is power deployed in a 
given society? 
This epistemological turn is relevant for two main reasons: a) the reinstatement of 
history, hence, of the material, factual, conditions in which the power relations are being 
held in a given society, i.e. dissolving Truth and Truisms, and; b) the individual agency 
of the subjects amidst power relations, i.e. power as a verb, as the outcome of “free” 
relations among contenders as opposed to power as a subjugation relation where one 
imposes the other, erasing all the individual traits of the subjugated.  
Hence, this epistemological shift tries to bring forth “…the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.”53 ; i.e. how does the 
objectification of the subject entail different power relations, hence power as the result of 
subjects not as a thing in itself. “”How,” not in the sense of “How does it manifest 
itself?” but “By what means is exercised?” and “What happens when individuals exert (as 
they say) power over others?””54 
For Foucault modernity is characterized in that the power relations within are 
structured around certain technique through which the individual is made subject, 
“…subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates 
and makes subject to.”55 The twofold agenda of modernity is: to define and to order.  
It is amidst this new modern “technique” in which struggles in modernity are 
held: domination (ethnic, social and religious), exploitation (economic alienation) and 
subjection (forms of subjectivity and submission) This last trait being a salient trend since 
                                                
53 Dreyfus, Michel Foucault, beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, 208. 
54 Ibid., 217. 
55 Ibid., 212. 
 25 
the emergence of the pastoral power: “We have to imagine and to build up what we could 
be to get rid of this kind of political “double bind,” which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power structures.”56 
“The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem 
of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the 
state’s institutions, but to liberate us both from the state, and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state (the objectification-reification of the 
individual in a particular state). We have to promote new forms of subjectivity 
through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for 
several centuries.”57 (Parenthesis is mine) 
This (re)conceptualization of power, as a relation and not a thing in itself brings 
forth the question: “…What are we? In a very precise moment of history. Kant’s question 
appears as an analysis of both us and our present.”58 
Gramsci’s principal concern is: “How to reconstruct the hegemonic apparatus of 
the ruling group …?”59 For the Italian author, the State is a combination of dictatorship 
and hegemony: “…State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with 
which the ruling class no only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win 
the active consent of those over whom it rules…”60 From this definition of State, we can 
elucidate Gramsci’s epistemological take, and hence, its practical consequences.  
Gramsci shares with Foucault the need to place the analysis of the social question 
in an historical, time and place, perspective, without obliterating the “will and initiative 
of men”. Hence, both authors would agree on conceptualizing power, as a relational act, 
without a “nature” of itself. Hence, what separates both thinkers?  
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It is my opinion that the chasm between these 2 philosophers could be elucidate 
through the concept of ideology presented by Gramsci. Ideology serves to “cement and 
unify” the ideological unity of the entire social bloc, and “…since all action is 
political…”61, ideology becomes the site for contestation for Gramsci, as opposed to 
Foucault where individual freedom is the goal. While Foucault is trying to untie the 
individual in order to breakthrough from its former condition, the dissolvent impulse, 
Gramsci proposes the creation of an encompassing “mechanism”, ideology, in order to 
subvert the ongoing domination, exploitation and subjection, the solidifying impulse.  
Hence, the Foucaultian “we” becomes a political dissolving category, one that 
looks to bring forth a type of knowledge, where how knowledge is administered in 
society in order to dominate, exploit, and subject the individual is unveiled. Foucault 
wants to understand what “we” is, and who is represented by it. On the other hand, the 
Gramscian “we” becomes a political solidifying category, in which domination, 
exploitation and subjection are reversed through the (organic, in the case of the 
revolutionaries that Gramsci is trying to support) creation of “ideology”, that cements the 
social (in this case the “revolutionary”) bloc, that would bring forth a certain type of 
State, through which individuals will subvert  the domination, exploitation and subjection 
relations.  
Gramsci and Foucault illustrate what has become the left contemporary debate: to 
create or to dissolve, the state or not the state.  
Álvaro García Linera’s -Bolivia’s current vice-president- in the context of the 
political process in Bolivia represents a Gramscian standpoint, or as we called it, the 
solidifying impulse: “Es posible cambiar el mundo transformando al 
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Estado…marginarnos de la lucha de la transformación del estado es renunciar a la lucha 
social y tener una actitud contemplativa a las relaciones de dominación…a la impotencia 
política”62; whereas the EZLN seems to embrace on Foucault’s position, and the need to 
dissolve “what we are”:  
“Mmh… el Poder… la evidencia incuestionable, el sueño húmedo de los 
intelectuales de arriba, la razón de ser de los partidos políticos… Siempre que 
prevalece una u otra forma de fascismo, la verdad y la justicia toman la forma de 
la Resistencia. 
Pero es que además puede decirse que la izquierda es constitutivamente 
resistencia. Sin duda la izquierda se precipitó en nuestro siglo en un insalvable 
error histórico, pero ese error consistió a todas luces en creer que la izquierda 
podía tomar el poder. La izquierda en el poder es una contradicción, bastante nos 
lo ha mostrado la historia de este siglo (…). 
Hoy está claro, me parece, que la izquierda no es el otro de la derecha, situadas 
ambas en una relación opuesta pero simétrica respecto del poder: la izquierda es 
ante todo el otro del poder, el otro ámbito y el otro sentido de la vida social, lo 
que queda sepultado y olvidado en el poder constituido, la vuelta de lo reprimido, 
la voz de la vida en común ahogada por la vida comunitaria, la voz de los 
desposeídos antes que la de los pobres (y la de los pobres sólo porque son 
mayoritariamente, pero no exclusivamente, los desposeídos) – la izquierda es la 
Voz de los Muertos.”63 (Emphasis mine) 
How does the Plurinational Bolivian State deals with who we are? Who is we in 
modern Bolivia? Who we are and for what reasons seems to be at the heart of the disputes 
among different civilizational projects.  
                                                
62 Álvaro García Linera Venezuela Foro Filosofía Estado, Revolución y construcción de Hegemonía. 
63 SCI Marcos, «Una Muerte...O Una Vida (Carta cuarta a Don Luis Villoro en el intercambio sobre Ética y 
Política)». 
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8. THE TIPNIS CONFLICT OR THE LIMITS OF MODERNITY 
In an editorial regarding the TIPNIS conflict in Bolivia, Edmundo Paz Soldán 
states: “El Tipnis traerá cola.”64 That same editorial, titled “Los Límites de Evo”, argues 
that:  
“Las crisis de los últimos meses muestran que Evo ha encontrado los límites de su 
poder. Hubo un momento en que su inmenso capital político le permitió 
“refundar” el país aprobando una nueva Constitución, arrinconar los deseos de 
autonomía de departamentos económicamente poderosos como Santa Cruz y 
burlar las leyes a su antojo para desmantelar cualquier intento de oposición a su 
gobierno. Y muestra que el estilo autoritario, centralista, bajo el viejo molde del 
caudillismo latinoamericano, puede gobernar pero no construir un Estado. Sin 
instituciones sólidas, el caudillo termina siendo víctima de las mismas fuerzas que 
lo encumbraron. Evo recibió un Estado en crisis; su carisma, su capacidad de 
convocatoria, maquillaron esa crisis, pero no la trascendieron. Su discurso 
etnopopulista de izquierda, además, trazó una serie de coordenadas de las que no 
puede desviarse; se sabe que, tarde o temprano, el gobierno debe dejar de 
subvencionar la gasolina y aumentar el precio, pero esa medida es vista más como 
de un gobierno neoliberal -las cosas deben costar lo que dice el mercado que 
cuesten- y no como de uno que se debe al pueblo; se sabe también que quizás se 
necesiten más carreteras para vincular internamente al país, pero éstas no pueden 
hacerse sin la venia de las comunidades indígenas a las que se les ha prometido 
autogobierno. Así, el modelo desarrollista de Evo naufraga en medio de sus 
contradicciones internas.”65 (Emphasis is mine) 
The effectiveness of this quote emanates from the “neutral” way in which the 
critique of Evo Morales and the re-foundation of Bolivia as a Plurinational State is 
framed. Throughout this quote, we can elucidate what is at stake when decolonization 
projects are launched. The violence of this critique, hence its effectiveness, arises from 
the superiority that one civilization/nation/citizenship is assumed to “naturally” possess 
against and upon others.  
                                                
64 País, «Los límites de Evo». 
65 Ibid. 
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It becomes imperative, in this case, to dissect this quote in order to unveil the 
mechanisms on which it bases its critique, rationality, irrationality and violence. It 
becomes imperative, not because it’s necessary to make it clear for the participants of the 
events. It’s not relevant because I, from and academic standpoint, have a better access to 
what is True, to what really is happening, or to what really should be done. As a matter of 
fact, this analysis doesn’t make any recommendations, nor formulates any theoretical 
framework nor poses neither a new True nor a unique solution. The modest goal of this 
research would be in any case, to reveal the political projects that are being put forth in 
Bolivia, and how the TIPNIS conflicts has dramatically rendered visible the contentious 
relations within that country in particular, and amidst Modernity in general.  
Hence, in order to counter-attack this civilizational enterprise that the editorial of 
El País embodies, we’ll use the concepts of Internal Colonialism, sociedad abigarrada, 
and chi’ixi. This research, since it is a knowledge project as well, is also overtly political. 
Modernity is the battlefield; through its articulation of time and space, it becomes the first 
global project, hence the scenario for the contentious relations among civilizations that 
persist to the present.  
9. DISSECTIONS  
What is at stake in Bolivia’s political project of decolonization through the 
formation of the Plurinational State?  Luis Macas, a Kichwa politician from Ecuador, 
points to two principal struggles within modernity, for the subalterns or the colonized 
subjects. The first one:  
“Por un lado, está la lucha para aplacar, por así decirlo, definitivamente, a los que 
hemos sido denominados como subalternos. Es una lucha tenaz que, al menos 
desde la hegemonía del Norte, piensan que debe ser resuelta con urgencia con 
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respecto a nosotros, los que no pensamos ni actuamos en conformidad con las 
coordenadas del pensamiento occidental y capitalista.”66  
The political reality beyond the rationalization or understanding of the oppression, 
but rather the oppression itself as a constant reality throughout time; the second struggle 
hence, the creation of the idea of that political reality; the epistemic struggle: 
“…hace referencia a la disputa que existe en el terreno del conocimiento, en la 
formación de los saberes: ¿es posible el reconocimiento de otro pensamiento?; si 
existen otras racionalidades, ¿qué lugar asingar a la racionalidad dominante? Los 
saberes se contruyen social e históricamente. Nos pertenecen a todos porque todos 
hemos participado en su construcción. Pero hemos participado desde diferentes 
posiciones y con maneras de apreciar, valorar y comprender la realidad también 
diferentes.”67  
Macas is pointing out the salience of indigenous peoples in modernity. But since 
indigenous peoples have participated from an “other” civilization, their contribution is 
limited to that which the Hegemonic project decides as right for itself.  
Reinaga pointed out that the Revolución India, was the Revolución del Tercer 
Mundo; the revolution of the Indigenous colonized subject, would necessarily imply the 
destruction of the grammar of Modernity in which individuals are ordered and subjugated 
to a historical contingent civilizational hegemonic norm. Macas, through the Plurinational 
State echoes this political position by asserting a State in which Ones and Others are 
visible:  
“…hasta el momento…lo que aún subsiste es la vision del Estado colonial que 
ahora se expresa con otra formas pero con el mismo contenido básico: la 
invisibilización del Otro. Es un Estado homogéneo, un Estado vertical, un Estado 
uninacional, porque no ha incorporado la existencia siquiera de los pueblos que 
estamos juntos.”68  
                                                
66 Pueblos indígenas, estado y democracia, 36. 
67 Ibid., 39–40. 
68 Ibid., 38. 
 31 
In the El País editorial quoted before, we can see how political and 
epistemological control agendas are deployed.  
a. Dissecting the Political 
Let’s focus first on the political critiques of the piece, where the author tries to 
eliminate the political agency of the subalterns by describing the political struggle as Evo 
Morales’ sole project.  
There are two principal critiques that I read from the El País editorial at a political 
level: the first argument refers to the misuse of some sort of “political capital” implying 
that Evo Morales wasted voter support throughout different elections, by not creating a 
strong (?), efficient (?) and effective (?) State. Hence, “el estilo autoritario, centralista, 
bajo el viejo molde del caudillismo latinoamericano, puede gobernar pero no construir un 
Estado. Sin instituciones sólidas, el caudillo termina siendo víctima de las mismas fuerzas 
que lo encumbraron.” This account violently misrepresents the political struggles that 
ended in the election of Evo Morales as President. By doing it so bluntly, it poses the 
inability of the Western Global Modernity, to understand that other forms of articulating 
the political are possible. This violence is not particular to Bolivia, Latin American 
political leaders, especially those which throughout history have in one way or another, 
and under different realities changed or challenged the preceding status quo regarding 
who is and who is not. Hence populist-populism tag has been an excellent way for 
politicians and academia to devalue re-definitions of the social question: Castro, Arbenz, 
Chávez, Morales, Correa, Kirchner, Perón, Cárdenas, López Obrador, Zelaya, Lula, 
Lagos, Toledo, Humala, and a long etc. have always been described as “Populist” in 
Western Academia. This is not to say that all of those politicians where anti-colonial 
fighters, or that they where looking for the liberation of the subalterns, simply that all 
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these politicians by challenging the previous definition of whom was and whom wasn’t 
part of the State they led, fitted immediately the populist category.  
The second argument, described as Morales’ ethno populist “straitjacket” which 
limits his governanance: “Su discurso etnopopulista de izquierda, además, trazó una serie 
de coordenadas de las que no puede desviarse;…” Hence, Evo Morales, in order to win 
office, had to promise a series of ethno-populist promises which now are backfiring: 
“…el gobierno debe dejar de subvencionar la gasolina y aumentar el precio, pero esa 
medida es vista más como de un gobierno neoliberal -las cosas deben costar lo que dice el 
mercado que cuesten- y no como de uno que se debe al pueblo; se sabe también que 
quizás se necesiten más carreteras para vincular internamente al país, pero éstas no 
pueden hacerse sin la venia de las comunidades indígenas a las que se les ha prometido 
autogobierno.” For the author the price of gas must be a perfect example of Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand, in which the invisible forces of supply and demand settle the 
price (OPEC, for example, becomes invisibilized). On the other hand, the author points 
out how Evo “promised” self-government to the indigenous communities, so now the 
State, cannot turn back, since that promise will mean an electoral defeat.  The author does 
not point out that the TIPNIS was lawfully established as an National Park in 1965 during 
the military government in Bolivia, and its status changed to Indigenous territory in 1992 
under the presidency of Jaime Paz Zamora during his second term as president, amidst 
the neoliberal wave which brought, among other things, multiculturalism. The Supreme 
Decree No. 22610, addresses the recognition by the Bolivian State of the indigenous 
peoples and its territories:  
“Se reconoce al Parque Nacional Isiboro­Sécure como territorio indígena de los 
pueblos Mojeño, Yuracaré y Chimán que ancestralmente lo habitan, 
constituyendo el espacio socioeconómico necesario para su desarrollo, 
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denominandose a partir de la fecha Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional 
Isiboro­Sécure.”69 
Therefore, construction of any type of infrastructure, such as highways in this 
indigenous territory is regulated: 
“Toda construcción y obras de desarrollo, particularmente, de vías camineras y 
poliductos, que se realicen en el Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional 
Isiboro­Sécure, debe contar, previamente, con un pormenorizado estudio de 
impacto ambiental, debidamente aprobado por el Ministerio de Asuntos 
Campesinos y Agropecuarios, con la participación de la organización indígena de 
la región. Las obras que estén en ejecución deberán ser paralizadas hasta contar 
con su respectivo estudio de impacto ambiental. Asimismo, todo proyecto o 
estudio a realizarse deberá ser consultado y coordinado con la organización 
indígena de la región.”70 (Emphasis mine) 
Hence, consultation as a political tool has been recognized by the State (which is 
not the same as saying that in that moment was when consultation appeared in the 
imaginary of the indigenous peoples) way before Evo Morales even dreamt of being 
president of Bolivia. 
b. Dissecting the Epistemological 
The author’s critique of the political, is intertwined with the epistemological, to 
eliminate the subalterns political agency, is to eliminate the subalterns’ knowledges: “Evo 
recibió un Estado en crisis; su carisma, su capacidad de convocatoria, maquillaron esa 
crisis, pero no la trascendieron.” Hence, expressions such as “al pueblo” and 
“comunidades indígenas” throughout the analysis are filled with passivity and without 
agency; the indigenous, and the people as passive receptors of the projects from above. 
By reducing indigenous peoples mobilizations as electoral mobilizations, the author 
reduces the scope, of at least some, of the indigenous movements within Bolivia.  
                                                
69 Bolivia, «Decreto Supremo 22610», Art. 1. 
70 Ibid., Art. 6. 
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c. The Political and Epistemological Knot 
The author concludes that: “Así, el modelo desarrollista de Evo naufraga en 
medio de sus contradicciones internas.” This finishing touch by the author reveals how 
the re-civilization conquest is put forward. What the author is implying in his analysis, is 
(a) that the State that Evo Morales now leads as president, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, has failed. Development, for the author, cannot pay attention to ethnicity, nor 
race, nor culture, nor difference; development is, or is not. Gasoline and highways are its 
expression, not political dissent. Hence, (b) the other, the subalterns, the Indigenous, the 
pueblo, the multitudes, are not legitimate knowledge actors, since their experiences have 
nothing to do with neutral concepts and knowledge such as “Development”.  
Yet the TIPNIS conflict, in my opinion, does point out to the internal 
contradictions and the limits not of Evo Morale’s regime, but of the Western Global 
Modernity Project when others knowledges, politics, economies, cultures, legal systems, 
etc., challenge the primacy of its supposed superior location in the civilizational project. 
The TIPNIS conflict and its contradictions from within, point out different conundrums 
that the Plurinational State in Bolivia faces nowadays.  
The Plurinational State, and its decolonization agenda, cannot be analyzed by the 
same token as its predecessor, i.e. the Liberal State. The social movements that 
participate in the TIPNIS protests against Evo Morales’ government are not the same 
social movements that organized against a Colonial/Republican/Neoliberal State in the 
1980’s and 90’s to achieve recognition of their nationality and territoriality.  
Modernity, as a civilization project, in which people are ordered and organized 
hierarchically, at the discretion of the elites along multiple, overlapping and multilayered 
power technologies, has always been contested from different trenches.  
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Which is the last of the trenches available for the colonized, marginalized and 
exploited? If we answered that question with Life, then, we would have to think how 
Modernity, at the limit, enforces its project: with violence. Those killed by Modernity 
share a privileged epistemic standpoint.  
Finally and as the El País Op-Ed points, the TIPNIS conflict, indeed, traerá cola.  
The struggle to name what the TIPNIS is (the question regarding who we are) and for 
whom, amidst Modernity will bring forth different struggles which could well show how 
Modernity in the limit is enforced. 
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Chapter 2 
1. CREATIVE CONTRADICTIONS-DESTRUCTIVE CONTRADICTIONS 
During the VI International Forum of philosophy, held in Venezuela on 201171, 
Álvaro García Linera pondered the four, unprecedented, “internal creative 
contradictions” that the revolutionary process in Bolivia to Socialism has created. These 
can be summarized as follows:  
1.  State as monopoly vs. Society as democratization: The State, as legitimate and 
democratic representative of the will of the majority, has the monopoly of power. 
But, since the Bolivian Revolution created a Social Movements government, 
which is inspired by the democratization of the decision making, inherent to 
Social Movements logic, a contradiction emerges: monopoly vs. democracy.  
2. Hegemony conundrum: The vanguard class of the Revolution, in the case of 
Bolivia, the Indigenous peoples, has to reach other classes in society (i.e. middle 
classes); in order to keep the Revolution going, it has to appeal all. In order to 
achieve this, the “core” of the Revolution (indigenous peoples), must yield to 
other interests. Therefore a contradiction emerges in the Government decision-
making process: the tension of governing for the vanguard of the movement, your 
supporters, or governing for all. 
3. Universal vs. Individual: This contradiction emerges when sectors from within the 
Revolution, that is sectors which rallied around the same universal goals (in 
Bolivia’s case, he gives examples such as: the election of Morales, the Constituent 
Assembly, the nationalization of the oil industry) begin to formulate “corporative” 
demands, that is, they start demanding specific, individual, requests (his examples 
                                                
71 Álvaro García Linera Venezuela Foro Filosofía Estado, Revolución y construcción de Hegemonía. 
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are the eastern lowland indigenous peoples of Bolivia, and the Central Obrera 
Boliviana, COB). They, the non-universal revolutionaries, by claiming 
particulars, act in detriment of all. 
4. Development and/or Nature: A greater wealth is needed to raise the living 
standards of all. In order to achieve it, we have to affect nature, cause “even 
breathing we affect it.” Some opposes these actions and would rather preserve 
Nature. 
There are multiple layers in the Vice-Presidents’ “creative contradictions” that are 
important to distinguish, in order to realize what is at stake; it is important to highlight 
that the Vice-President, in addition to other faculties, coordinates the relations among the 
Executive, Legislative and autonomous governments and participates in the sessions held 
by the cabinet members, in order to assist the President in the “management of the overall 
government policy”.   
As noted above, this speech was given in Venezuela, on the 28 of November 
2011, barely a month after Law No. 180 was enacted, as the VIII March for the “Defensa 
del Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure TIPNIS, por los Territorios, la 
Vida, Dignidad y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas” arrived La Paz demanding the 
State stop the construction of the highway that would pass through the TIPNIS. This 
march was mainly organized by the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente 
Boliviano (CIDOB), articulated entirely by indigenous peoples of the Bolivian eastern 
lowlands. 
Most of the time during his speech, to illustrate the “creative contradictions” of 
the process, García Linera only uses abstract assumptions. He repeatedly uses the figure 
of the dam and the highway, “You want to build a highway, that would bring 
development, but some compañeros are against it.” Only in the case of the third 
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contradiction, universal vs. particular, García Linera gives two specific examples: the 
eastern lowland indigenous peoples and the COB, the biggest workers union in Bolivia. 
He frames the contradiction as follows: the compañeros, our compas (“with whom we 
have marched…”), the indigenous peoples of the eastern lowlands (who are just 200,000 
or 250,000) oppose the distribution, by the State, of recently recovered lands to 
landowners, to Andean highland indigenous peoples, mainly Aymara and Quechua 
(which are the majority of the “indigenous movement” with 6 million people). Therefore, 
a minority group, on a big territory, denies a majority group with little territory their 
“universal” rights to land ownership. 
García Linera was joined in the panel discussion, entitled “State, Revolution and 
the Construction of Hegemony”, by philosopher Enrique Dussel, and Venezuela’s Vice-
President Elías Jaua. The Bolivian politician throughout his speech constantly contrasted 
his current position as an active member of the government to his former position outside 
of it (academia-guerrilla warfare), stating that these contradictions only became visible 
through the actually governing of the state, not through theory. He, Álvaro García Linera, 
between the philosopher, Dussel, and the politician, Jaua, discussing in Gramscian terms 
the liberation of the subalterns through State-Revolution-Hegemony parameters, 
represents, embodies, the Gramscian project (or, at least, one of its more common 
interpretations), that of the organic vanguard, which generates the organic bloc that puts 
forth a new organic hegemony. 
The plurinational hegemony, and its contestation from within, is what brings forth 
García Lineras’ “creative contradictions”. How come this government (the plurinational) 
fueled by an organic universal which was achieved, primarily, by the work of indigenous 
peoples (since they are the  “nucleus of the movement” which is expressed in the new 
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constitution), making that universal fair (since it was achieved by an organic Constituent 
Assembly) be contested by those who made it (the universal)?  
What is the organic vanguard left to do? García Linera finishes by pointing out 
that there was no solution to these contradictions, and “luchar, luchar y luchar” is the 
only way out; the fight for hegemony (“Hegemonía al final, es el arte de la “conquista, 
seducción y consolidación”).  
Let me offer a (minimal) summary of García Lineras’ speech: the year 2011 was a 
rough year for the Morales’ administration, but since they are inside problems, nuestros 
compas, there is no need to panic, Revolution will prevail. 
Who, I think, would be panicking, under the light of recent events? Who is his 
audience? The Hegemony he is thinking of, embodied in multiple ways through the 
Forum, is composed of different actors, among others: Nation-States. Bolivia, for 
example, is an active member of UNASUR, which in recent years, following the 
momentum and support from “left” governments in Latin America, has set in motion 
(multimillion) regional projects, such as the Iniciativa para la Integración de la 
Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA).72  
The room, as well, is full of “revolutionaries”, which García Linera tries to ease. 
The Revolution is possible. That long process, all that struggle, all that falling down and 
standing up again, all that blood, sweat and tears, was not in vain, there is an end, and it 
spells Socialism. 
Finally, his message goes to the compas -the organic bloc, we- a wakeup call to 
the Vanguard, to fit in again, to rally around the flag; to stop seeking “individual”, 
                                                
72 It is worth noting that two members, Colombia and Chile, are not “left” governments, although the latter 
joined UNASUR while governed by leftwing Concertación.  
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“corporatist”, “selfish”, and anti-universal, claims, in a nutshell: to obey, since organic-
we knows better.  
As a good Gramscian, García Linera reinforces Hegemony as Hegemony-
institutions, Hegemony-ideas and Hegemony-correlations of power. 
But, what if, García Linera’s idea about the participation of (different) indigenous 
peoples was not right? What if, as Subcentral TIPNIS leader Fernando Vargas Mosúa 
declared, the indigenous support for Evo Morales was a mistake?  
When asked, during the III National Commission of the CIDOB which resolved 
to start the IX march “Por la Defensa de la Vida y Dignidad, los Territorios Indígenas, 
los Recursos Naturales, la Biodiversidad, el Medio Ambiente y las Áreas Protegidas, 
Cumplimiento de la CPE (Constitución Política del Estado) y el Respeto de la 
Democracia” towards La Paz on the 25th of April, if he felt indigenous peoples had been 
used by the Morales Government, Vargas Mosúa answered:  
“…más bien los indígenas nos sentimos engañados, creyendo que Morales iba a 
ser un presidente indígena que respetaría los derechos territoriales y del pueblo 
boliviano y más bien adoptó un comportamiento contradictorio… Lo más triste 
del Gobierno que el mandatario sabe y conoce cómo son las estructuras de los 
pueblos indígenas, porque él viene de una organización social, pero  las rompe y 
su relación es directamente Gobierno – Comunidad, es la típica representatividad 
de las empresas petroleras.”73 (Emphais Mine) 
His argument, if not carefully read, may leave the impression that the 
disappointment stems from Morales not being an indigenous president, some sort of false 
indigenous. Rather, he explains, their disappointment is based on how the Government 
has broken, and therefore neglected, the different indigenous social structures through 
which the various indigenous peoples of the eastern Bolivian lowlands are organized. 
                                                
73 «Líder del Tipnis: ‘Respaldo indígena a Evo fue una equivocación’ | eju.tv». 
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Both accounts, García Linera’s and Vargas Mosúa’s lay out the contentious space 
in which struggles to give meaning to the political are shaped and held. 
2. THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS GOVERNMENT, AN APPROACH FROM WITHIN 
In 2010, Álvaro García Linera presented on the construction of the Bolivian 
plurinational state, in the University of Buenos Aires. In his account, from the approval 
by referendum of the new Political Constitution, Bolivia has embarked in a political shift 
that:  
“…reivindica, propugna y comienza a construir lo que hemos denominado un 
Estado Plurinacional, una economía social comunitaria y un proceso de 
descentralización del poder bajo la forma de las autonomías departamentales, 
indígenas y reagionales. Un Estado complejo.”  
García Linera compares two concepts; the first coined by Marx and René Zabaleta 
Mercado (a Bolivian philosopher) the “apparent” state and the second by Gramsci, the 
“integral” state. The first kind of state comprises the political and territorial institutions, 
which only represents some of the “actors” of the social structure. This state is viewed as 
the property of someone or some elite, a patrimonial state, which leaves at the margins 
without representation or mediation to the vast majority of citizens.  
On the other hand, Gramsci’s Integral State is based in an equilibrium between 
the Institutional Political Body of the State and the Civil Society, this in order for the 
State to start loosing against society its monopolist functions, and becoming a mere 
public administrator and manager (cause the power structures will reside in Society 
itself). In other words, García’s Linera depiction of the state is an instrumentalist one, and 
the Plurinational State concepts looks for a redistribution of power relations within 
Bolivia.  
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To achieve the Integral State through the Plurinational State, Garcia Linera 
delineated three lines of action: 
1. The project that the government assumes of transformation, of 
nationalization, of economic empowerment, of economic diversification, 
of the development of the economy of the Communities’; a strategic 
development project created and formed by the social movements;  
2. The incorporation into the Constitution of Community Democracy (voto 
comunitario); which describes the possibility of other forms of grounding 
political representation and mediation;  
3. Changing the mechanisms for the selection of the State staff shifting the 
“nature” of the bureaucracy74. This point accounts for a shift into what 
should be the profile of public servants, as well as the requirements and 
constraints to participate in the State and its governance.  
The “social movements” generated this general course, Evo Morales’ political 
agenda, therefore, it is an organic one. Since the social movements are in the center of the 
political and power relations and conflicts, it is important to map these social movements, 
understand their nature as well as the political cleavage or cleavages against which they 
are reacting. These “social movements” start to become the centers, the space, in which 
citizenship, in the Plurinational State, is defined; the “social movements” as the 
legitimate interlocutor with the state. 
                                                
74 For a contextualized account of this point please refer to the following website: 
http://www.infolatam.com/2011/05/08/bolivia-partido-de-morales-aprueba-las-reglas-para-elegir-
magistrados/ This example shows how changing parameters in the selection of personnel can lead to a 
struggle for the decolonization of the State. 
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3. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORY 
Social movement theory since its first theorists, authors as LeBon and Freud, 
came about around the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century struggling with 
one principal question: Why do people get out and start acting in regards to a collective 
good? Freud said that the libido (love) of each individual is what makes us go into the 
street, while authors such as LeBon emphasized the shared grievances of people. Both 
authors, with different semantics talked about the same: shared characteristics, shared 
grievances, shared necessities that would bring the people out, mobilizing them and 
taking action into their own hands.  
This first wave of collective action theories was rapidly challenged under the 
argument that if grievances are what mobilizes people, and them have been present in all 
the political systems, then why there are not always revolutions, rebellions, riots, etc., 
going on? This paradigm gave rise to two different schools also with different answers. 
On the one hand the Resource Mobilization theories, with authors such as McCarthy and 
Zald, who emphasized organization and resources (and the access to them by the 
“organizers”) hence, an individualistic (individual agency) approach. What matters in 
order to mobilize is the quantity of resources in society for the “social movements 
entrepreneurs” to use, regardless of everything else.  
On the other side were the structuralist-Marxist or functionalist approaches, 
authors such as Tilly and Skocpol, who emphasized “political opportunities”. By 
focusing more on the system and the structures within, they formulated a macro-theory of 
social movements in which individuals are not the principal actors, and individual choice 
is relegated to the background. This model is present in many areas of the social sciences: 
economy, political science, anthropology, sociology, business, etc. In all those cases, this 
problem has been studied as the relation between two or more actors, the owner of a 
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factory and its workers for example. But, what happens when the actor is the crowd? The 
dynamic part of Social Movements, identifying and understanding the “adversary”, has 
become a sort of a butterfly hunt where theories seem to make sense to a given “catch” 
butterfly (self-selection bias).  
The 1980’s and 1990’s in Latin America among other regions, and the myriad of 
social movements that emerged from within, made theorists around the world rethink the 
collective action paradigm. As Escobar and Alvarez described, although people in the 
region where suffering one of the harshest economic crisis of recent times and amidst 
serious efforts by the political and economical elites to diminish the state responsibilities 
through its reduction, imposed by the Washington consensus, numerous forms of 
resistance arose. This contradicted the functionalist approach: these democracies now had 
“institutional” channels for political-social discontent. Political parties should be 
representing their citizens and, channeling the political discontent. Roberts’ review points 
out: “The tendency for popular mobilization to wane following transitions to democratic 
rule, the difficulty of constructing horizontal linkages between grassroots organizations to 
enhance their political leverage, and the strained relationships frequently existing 
between popular organizations and the formal representative institutions of democratic 
regimes”. What is the role of the Social Movements in democratic Latin America? On the 
other side, if crisis was hitting people, how could they even manage to try to get to the 
street and protest when they have to find enough to eat? The Resource Mobilization 
theorists couldn’t explain much either. 
The New Social Movements theorists appeal to changes in the political practice: 
“…the new theories see contemporary social movements as bringing about a 
fundamental transformation in the nature of political practice and theorizing 
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itself…a multiplicity of social actors establish their presence and spheres of 
autonomy in a fragmented social and political space”75.  
These new social movements embody: 1) a widening of the “socio-political 
citizenship” and 2) a transformation or appropriation by the actors of the cultural field 
through their search for a collective identity. (Escobar and Alvarez) They refer then to 
social movements in terms of “collective identities” in order to address both structure and 
individual agency and their constant, historic and fluid interactions.  
4. MCADAM-MCCARTHY, CHARLES TILLY AND TUPAC KATARI 
García Linera defines a social movement as: 
 “…un tipo de acción colectiva, que intencionalmente busca modificar los 
sistemas sociales establecidos o defender algún interés material, para lo cual se 
organizan y cooperan con el propósito de desplegar acciones públicas en función 
de esas metas o reivindicaciones.” 
He also describes the three minimal characteristics which social movements must 
have, being the first one “ Una estructura de movilización o sistema de toma de 
decisiones, de deliberación, de participación, de tareas, procedimientos, jerarquías y 
mandos que le permiten llevar adelante sus acciones públicas…”76 This first 
characteristic is based in McAdam, McCarty and Zald “Social Movements” theory that 
stresses the rational and organizational aspects of collective action and the mobilization 
of resources. The second characteristic pointed by García Linera is “Unos repertorios de 
movilización, o métodos de lucha, mediante los cuales despliega públicamente su 
escenografía de acción colectiva para hacerse oír, lograr adherentes y lograr sus metas.” 
This second charateristic is based on Charles’ Tilly “political opportunities” theory 
framework, hence in his structuralist approach to social movements.  
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The third characteristic is: “Una identidad colectiva y registros culturales que le 
permitan diferenciarse colectivamente, articular experiencias pre-existentes, cohesionar a 
sus miembros, legitimar sus acciones, identificar sus oponentes y definir sus demandas”. 
This third and final minimal characteristic of social movements its not backed up by any 
theorist in García Linera’s exposition, which points out the strain common in social 
movements theory about what to do with identities, culture, emotions and feelings.  
It is not but until recently that these aspects had been incorporated into social 
movements theory. In Deborah’s Gould “Moving Politics. Emotions and ACT UP’s Fight 
against AIDS” we find the recognition of the affective dimension of the processes and 
practices that make up the political. The introduction of affect, on the one side, addresses 
why people organize despite the material perils and grievances, and on the other how 
social movements become sites where social meaning is generated and disseminated. For 
Gould the “movement” part in “social movements” addresses the realm of affect; bodily 
intensities emotions, feelings and passions. As this characteristic is inherent to all human 
beings, the affective dimension is part of the practices and processes that make up “the 
political”. This different ontology, this different conception of social reality, “recognizes 
emotion as a ubiquitous feature of human life that is present in, influences and brings 
meaning to every aspect of social life, including the realm of the political action and 
inaction.” 
Gould differentiates then between affect and emotion: the first one is a bodily, 
sensory, inarticulate, non-conscious experience (full of potential), while the latter is the 
actualization or concretization of that emotion into the flow of living. Hence, the 
separation between affect and emotion 1) preserves a space for human motivation that is 
non-conscious, non-cognitive, non-linguistic, non-coherent, non-rational and un-
predetermined  (deriving in the realization or not of a political action) and, 2) explains 
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why contradictory feelings operate more at the level of affection than at a level of 
nameable emotions. 
The concept of affect then presupposes sociality, as affect is shaped and 
actualized by social phenomena. For Gould, as affection is mediated by society, through 
emotions, an “emotional habitus” is established in which a “social grouping’s collective 
and only partly conscious emotional dispositions, that is, members embodied, axiomatic 
inclinations toward certain feelings and ways of emoting.” Hence, the habitus gives the 
individual and collective practices a structure, and also permits a dialectical relationship 
between structure and practice: “they (society and individuals) make, unmake and remake 
one another.” (Gould; 2009), recognizing the contingency natural to power relations.  
Finally it’s worth noting about Gould’s theory that by differentiating affect from 
emotion, the first “has the potential to escape social control, and that quality creates 
greater space for counter hegemonic possibilities and for social transformations…” 
(Gould; 2009); i.e., domination is never complete, agency prevails, a least until death.  
When thinking about social movements, Bolivian philosopher Luis Tapia 
acknowledges that in countries such as Bolivia:  
“…no todas las fuerzas se mueven en la misma dirección…algunos procesos no 
son solamente movimientos sociales, o sea, movilización y acción política de 
ciertas fuerzas o de una parte de la sociedad con la finalidad de reformar algunas 
de sus estructuras, sino que también en algunos casos son movimiento de 
sociedades en proceso de conflicto más o menos colonial en el seno de un país 
estructuralmente heterogéneo”77 (Emphasis mine) 
Hence, Tapia describes the complexity of Latin American societies in which 
colonial power relations still exist and operate. Social movements emerge in Tapia’s 
account when state formations and its mediation of conflict with civil society don’t face 
nor resolve the conflict regarding the social and political order, bringing forth the 
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dynamic political forms of social movements. But in colonial contexts such as the 
Bolivian  
“…que tienen un carácter más denso que el de un movimiento social. En muchos 
casos se trata de la movilización de un conjunto significativo de las estructuras 
políticas y sociales de otras sociedades…subalternizadas por la colonización…” 
(Emphasis mine)78 
5. MAPPING STRUCTURES 
Evo Morales election in 2005 should not be reduced to an electoral event. What 
the concept of “social movements government” is pointing at is a shift in the way that 
power was exercised in Bolivia and a shift as well of the places/spaces where the political 
is contested.  
By mapping the political struggles, identities, and social/societal/civilizational 
structures that emerged, shifted and were reformulated during the period from 1952 to the 
present, it becomes possible to observe the practical implications of this concept, as well 
as the resulting identity emanating from it. 
a. Revolution shall give you identity 
In 1952, the MNR through its Nationalistic revolution inserted the Indigenous 
Populations into the State, as well as it introduced the centrality of class in a new 
nationalistic context, as the basis for social change. 
MNR revolution was in part successful because of its incorporation of the 
indigenous population (rural) and the miners (urban) that were in clear antagonism with 
the landowners (terratenientes) and mine owners. Through reforms such as the 
incorporation of all “Bolivians” to the State through universal suffrage, land reform, 
nationalization of mining, and school curricula reform, the new “Revolutionary” State 
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championed and alliance between all “classes”, the emergence of a new citizen. “La 
ideología emenerrista (from the MNR) persigue el objetivo nunca cumplido de 
homogeneización de la población boliviana.”79. This homogenization meant for the 
indigenous, rural, populations their incorporation to the State through social class, 
peasantry. On the other side the urban indigenous and mestizo where incorporated as 
labor, as working classes.  
These social classes and groups were integrated to the MNR, as part of the 
corporative elements of the State. Through this corporate attempt, the revolutionary 
process contributes to the consolidation of the peasant movement through the creation of 
Peasant Unions represented through the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of 
Bolivia (CNTCB for its initials in Spanish). Even though the name resemblances the 
language of Marxist-unionized imaginary, this Peasant Unions “…se limitan raramente a 
actuar como un instrumento de lucha y negociación, y se convierten en instancias de 
gestión de la vida social.” (Do Alto, 2007; P. 26) The Peasant Unions despite its name: 
“…poco tiene que ver con el sindicato obrero, ya que designa un tipo de 
asociación tradicional de familias unificadas por obligaciones y derechos en torno 
a la posesisión familiar-comunal de tierras y responsabilidades políticas 
locales.”80  
On the other hand, Labor Unions were corporatized to the State through the 
Bolivian Workers Union (COB).  
“Entre los años 1952 y 1960, si bien la política fue unipolar en la medida en que 
un solo partido ocupaba el escenario dominante y regulador de las 
representaciones y acciones políticas de la sociedad, el MNR, éste era un partido 
mayoritariamente compuesto por sindicatos agrarios y obreros que de manera 
corporative eran el sustento electoral del partido y de sus distintas tendencias 
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internas. De ahí que se puede hablar en esta época de una unipolaridad partidista-
sindical de izquierda reformista.”81 
What García Linera is explaining is how power relations shifted during the MNR 
revolution, and as power relations shift the places where the power is exercised tend to 
shift also: peasantry and labor became the new channels for incorporation to the Nation.  
b. 1964 to 1982: The other governments 
Amidst an internal crisis between the conservative and radical (miners union) 
wings of the MNR, and as the discontent arises among conservative sectors in Bolivia, 
from the Land Reform, the revolutionary era of the MNR concludes with the return of the 
Armed Forces. In the face of these events, both the leftist labor unions and the peasant 
movement adopt different attitudes. 
Labor unions were highly persecuted and repressed and became the opposite pole 
of the State. “…el campo político se escindió en dos polos; por una parte, el ejército, que 
hacía el papel de articulador de fracciones empresariales, en tanto que la COB 
desempeñaba el centro unificador de lo nacional-popular de raigambre obrera y 
urbana.”82 For García Linera these were the times where the elites were in 
association with the army and society exercised citizenry rights through unions and 
national organizations as the COB: “Dictadura military y ciudadanía sindical eran los 
polos ordenadores del campo político…”83  
Indigenous peasantry, on the other hand, formulated with the Armed Forces 
in1964 a “Peasant-Military Pact” (PMC). This consolidated the idea of a false ideology 
peasantry, sell-out to the state, which implied the subordination, on different accounts, of 
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the indigenous to the eyes of both the economical-military elites and the labor union 
citizenry.  
As Hervé Do Alto states, this PMC meant for the indigenous peasantry two 
important things: firstly, the respect for the achievements of the revolution, 
specifically the distribution of land, achievement of citizenry, and education reform. 
These attainments represented for the first time ever, since the Spaniard conquest, the 
recognition of the Indigenous as Bolivians, even if it was under the peasantry identity. 
Also, these represented a tangible change in social mobility for the indigenous 
populations.  
Secondly, within the indigenous movement, the recognition of their communal 
way of organization through the Ayllu (interpreted by the non-indigenous elites as 
unions) helped actualize a political, social and economical tool, which also brought the 
memory of other cultural repertoires of contention (even though it was used by the elites 
for the continuation of the exploitation of the indigenous lands). As it was mentioned 
before, the Peasant Unions was the legitimization of another cultural practice, the Ayllu. 
Felipe Quispe defines Ayllu as the fundamental political, ideological, economical, social 
and religious base of the Aymara and Qhiswa (Quechua), formed by the union of the 
community families.  
When García Linera expresses that the only realms of the political run through the 
two opposite poles conformed by economical-military elites and unionized citizenry, fails 
to recognize that multiple-cleavages cross Bolivian power relations. The peasantry 
identity served the Indigenous as a tool for the actualization of their social, political and 
economical formations through the Ayllu. By being more than a peasant union, and 
something different from that pre-Spaniard Ayllu, this social structure permitted the 
elaboration of what Linda Tuhiwai Smith defines as the 25 indigenous projects, such as 
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revitalization of cultural practices, the redefinition of representation, the reframing of the 
Indigenous relation with the land, etc.84 In this regard, I consider flawed García’s Linera 
definition of this period as characterized by an attenuated political polarity with 
corporatist political subjects and non-partisan politics.  
This redefinition of the Indigenous is evident with the rise of new elites in the 
interior of the CNCTB, which start by opposing the PMC and started elaborating a new 
indigenous discourse. This new radicalized leadership, known as “Kataristas”, represents 
a new Indigenous identity that was only possible to attain through the social mobility 
channels obtained and maintained through the Revolution and the Military Dictatorship. 
This new leadership that had access, even if it was precarious, to the state, to land, and to 
education as well as to the urban centers, redefined the Indigenous Issues.  
“…el katarismo plantea desde su surgimiento la articulación de la revaloración de 
lo “indio” con la cuestión de clase. Asimismo, los kataristas consideran que existe 
una doble opresión del campesino: a nivel social y cultural como indio y a nivel 
económico por la explotación de su fuerza de trabajo.”85 
c. Multiculturalism and Juridical Pluralism 
“Reconocer que Bolivia es multicultural y plurilingue es reconocer tardíamente 
algo que siempre ha existido en los hechos.”86 
For Luis Tapia, liberal multiculturalism presents itself:  
“…bajo una apariencia cosmopolita, pero en realidad es la forma contemporánea 
y encubierta del racismo, esto es, asumir como un hecho la existencia y la práctica 
de una cultura y un tipo de sociedad superior a las demás: el supuesto de que las 
puede contener cuando en realidad solo las traduce y, de ese modo, las traslada 
imaginaria y falazmente a su seno.”87 
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In 1994, multiculturalism is introduced in Bolivia’s constitutional framework. The 
first article of the 1967 constitution that read: “Bolivia, libre, independiente y soberana, 
constituida en República unitaria, adopta para su gobierno la forma democrática 
representativa.”88, changed to:  
“Bolivia, libre, independiente y soberana, multiétnica y pluricultural, consituida 
en República unitaria, adopta para su gobierno la forma democrática 
representativa, fundada en la unión y la solidaridad de todos los bolivianos.”89 
(Emphasis mine)  
In the same key, article 171 changed to:  
“Se reconocen, se respetan y protegen en el marco de la ley, los derechos sociales, 
económicos y culturales de los pueblos indígenas que habitan en el territorio 
nacional, especialmente los relativos a sus tierras comunitarias de origen, 
garantizando el uso y aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales, a su 
identidad, valores, lenguas, costumbres e instituciones. 
El Estado reconoce la personalidad jurídica de las comunidades indígenas y 
campesinas y de las asociaciones y sindicatos campesinos. 
Las autoridades naturales de las comunidades indígenas y campesinas podrán 
ejercer funciones de administración y aplicación de normas propias como 
solución alternativa de conflictos, en conformidad a sus costumbres y 
procedimientos, siempre que no sean contrarias a esta Constitución y las leyes. La 
ley compatibilizará estas funciones con las atribuciones de los Poderes del 
Estado.”90 
The president that enacted the constitutional amendments which introduce the 
multicultural reforms to Bolivia was Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada who ran with an 
indigenous vice-president, the first ever indigenous to access the State in modern Bolivia, 
Victor Hugo Cárdenas.  
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In a 2002 interview, Cárdenas stated that: “Creo que nuestra presencia en el 
gobierno demuestra que en Bolivia es poible la construcción de una democracia 
multiétnica, a pesar del carácter inicial y provisional de los avances realizados…”91 He 
defines multi-ethnic democracy as: 
“…la combinación creativa de las virtudes de la democracia indígena con la 
democracia liberal, porque no consideramos que la democracia sea sinónimo de 
liberalismo…En un país como Bolivia esas dos democracias tienen que sumar sus 
virtudes, y esto significa, por ejemplo, que hasta la propia democracia indígena 
tiene que sacrificar varias cosas internamente que no son democráticas. A eso 
llamamos democracia multiétnica.”92 
He continues to elaborate on what he considers to be the appropriate ways for 
indigenous movements to act in the multicultural/multiethnic state: 
“Entonces, y a propósito del movimiento indígena, nosotros hemos sido 
protagonistas de esa manera de entender el liderazgo aymara en la lucha 
democrática. Pero hay otra clase de liderazgo aymara que esta más en la pelea por 
separarse de los marcos de la izquierda marxista tradicional. Se trata de un 
liderazgo que tiene una enorme desconfianza en la lucha democrática, es una 
mezcla de indianismo reinaguista y cheguevarismo, algo que yo llamo 
fundamentalismo étnico. Obviemante que para esta clase de liderazgo, la alianza 
con Goni (Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada) no puede representar otra cosa que no sea 
una claudicación, una adscripción al neoliberalismo.”93 
 The former ex-vice president is asked “¿Estás planteando la existencia de un 
comportamiento político distinto de ese liderazgo aymara más moderno y democrático e 
integrado a la democracia liberal frente a aquél otro liderazgo, digamos más tradicional?” 
(emphasis mine) to which he answers: “Sí…”94  
Rivera Cusicanqui describes the multicultural agenda as mandated-regulated by 
the elites:  
                                                
91 United Nations Development Programme, Política Y Sociedad En El Espejo, 45. 
92 Ibid., 45–46. 
93 Ibid., 46. 
94 Ibid. 
 55 
 “Las elites bolivianas han adoptado un multiculturalismo oficial, plagado de citas 
de Kymlicka, y anclado en la noción de los indígenas como minorías…El 
corolario fue un multiculturalismo ornamental y simbólico, con fórmulas como el 
“etno-turismo” y el “eco-turismo”, que ponían en juego la teatralización de la 
condición “originaria”, anclada en el pasado e incapaz de conducir su propio 
destino.”95 
What is the Neoliberal multicultural Project? What do the Neoliberal 
multiculturalism assumptions reveal, and what do they conceal? What are the limits of 
Neoliberal Multiculturalism? 
Charles R. Hale proposes that multiculturalism in Latin America has minimally 
entailed the “recognition of cultural difference, in the sense of the now ubiquitous official 
affirmations that, “we are a multi-ethnic, pluri-lingual society”.”96 In this sense, it’s 
different from classical liberalism, for which individuals are the essence, since 
multicultural theorists acknowledge the possibility of a multicultural citizenship: 
“…(W)hich is predicated on the idea that group rights and the central tenets of 
political liberalism can be compatible with one another. Will Kymlicka, for 
example, introduces a key distinction between 'external protections' and 'internal 
restrictions': the former offers a means to ensure equality for and prevent 
discrimination of the culturally oppressed within the liberal tradition, while the 
latter contravenes the fundamental liberal principle of individual freedom. 
Kymlicka and others also have worked out similar proposed solutions to related 
problems, involving political representation, educational policies, language rights, 
etc.”97 
The limits of Neoliberal multiculturalism may be drawn, hence from:  
“Who, for example, makes the fine distinctions that determine when an initiative 
is needed for 'external protection' of an oppressed group's cultural rights, and 
when that initiative has 'gone too far' into the realm of 'internal restrictions'? The 
answer, implicitly at least, is 'the state'. And yet, this notion of the state as 
impartial arbiter of the conflict between individual and group rights is deeply 
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suspect, since in nearly every important question of cultural rights the state is also 
a key protagonist in that conflict.”98 
Juliet Hooker, through the analysis of the Black populations in Latin America, 
draws the limits of Neoliberal multiculturalism, and its representation of subjects through 
cultural parameters:  
“While the goal of multicultural reforms may have been the promotion of 
democratic legitimacy by remedying social exclusion, the criteria used to 
determine the appropriate subjects of collective rights have not been racial 
discrimination or socio-economic and political marginalization. I argue that the 
main criterion used to determine the recipients of collective rights in Latin 
America has been the possession of a distinct cultural group identity.”99  
The openness of Neoliberal multiculturalism to cultural rights, through the 
multicultural citizenship, cancels on the other hand the recognition of rights through other 
parameters such as race and class:  
“Multicultural citizenship reforms in Latin America privilege certain kinds of 
subjects and certain modes of framing grievances that have potentially negative 
consequences. The need to assert an ethnic or culturally distinct group identity in 
order to successfully claim collective rights means that not only the majority of 
Afro-Latinos, but some indigenous groups as well, are unable to gain such rights. 
The problem is that as a result Afro-Latinos who are unable to assert an 'ethnic' 
identity lack a solid claim to collective rights even though they may also suffer 
from political exclusion and racial discrimination.”100 
Therefore, the ultimate goal of Neoliberal multiculturalism is to organize societies 
within the state, in a hierarchical way:  
“La reforma del estado ha reconocido esta diversidad cultural en la modificación 
del artículo primero de la Constitución… pero en ninguno de estos casos reconoce 
ni instituye la igualdad entre las culturas y los pueblos porque no reconoce que 
son sociedades, es decir, totalidades, y no solo lenguas y creencias diferentes. Se 
puede reconocer la diversidad cultural sin reconocer su igualdad.”101 (Emphasis 
mine) 
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If, as if Luis Tapia argues that multiculturalism and plurilinguism is the 
recognition of something that has always existed in Bolivia, Legal Pluralism is too:  
“For the Sánchez de Lozada government, the indigenous customary law issue was 
part of a larger effort to accommodate Bolivia’s formal legal system to the reality 
of a country where justice is administered mainly in informal, oral, local settings 
and to create a more humane system, closer to the people, that promotes 
reconciliation and human rights.”102 
 Donna Lee Van Cott defines legal pluralism as “…the simultaneous existence of 
distinct normative systems within one single territory, a condition usually associated with 
colonial rule.”103 Legal pluralism, then is just the regulation of other juridical systems, 
and their incorporation into the national juridical framework, which regulates and 
enforces Multicultural Citizenship. As noted before, the amendment to article 171 
recognized that:  
“Las autoridades naturales de las comunidades indígenas y campesinas podrán 
ejercer funciones de administración y aplicación de normas propias como 
solución alternativa de conflictos, en conformidad a sus costumbres y 
procedimientos, siempre que no sean contrarias a esta Constitución y las leyes. 
La ley compatibilizará estas funciones con las atribuciones de los Poderes del 
Estado.” (Emphasis mine) 
Indigenous communities, consequently, had the “authorization” of the State to 
exercise their own legal system; but, in the other side, the State does not grant any 
provision in order to this to happen. Principally, there is no discussion, nor inclusion, of 
property rights or land redistribution among the “comunidades indígenas”, legal 
pluralism, and multiculturalism, as a depoliticized tool of the Neoliberal State: “It is 
possible to interpret the limits of indigenous jurisdiction as either “fundamental rights” or 
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as the constitution and other laws.”104 How does the plural and multiple works among not 
equals? 
In the International arena, as Karen Engle proposes: “cultural rights have provided 
the dominant framework for indigenous rights advocacy since at least the 1990s.”105 This 
strategy, for the author, has put forth some of the “the dark sides of virtue”:  
“As the right to culture has developed over the years, I contend that it has largely 
displaced or deferred the very issues that initially motivated much of the 
advocacy: issues of economic dependency, structural discrimination, and lack of 
indigenous autonomy. This displacement occurs even when the right to culture is 
used specifically with the aim of promoting development that is thought to accord 
with indigenous culture. In fact, I suggest that increased cultural rights sometimes 
lead to decreased opportunities for autonomy and development.”106 (Emphasis 
mine) 
For the author, hence, there have been 2 strategies, two different paths that 
indigenous peoples have forged in the international arena: one regarding cultural rights, 
the other self-determination rights:  
“The right to self-determination, for example, comes in a strong form that asserts 
the right of secession or independence as a nation-state, a weaker form that claims 
significant legal and political autonomy within existing states, and a still weaker 
form that is often articulated as human right. Similarly, the right to culture 
sometimes implicates strong collective rights for land and territory, while at other 
times it is used to support individual indigenous people against indigenous groups 
that are attempting to limit their rights.”107 
In this sense, there are are 2 legal tools which the international indigenous 
movements have crafted in recent times regarding self-determination: the 1989 
International Labor Organization Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007; for example article 3 of the UN Declaration 
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states that: “Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.”108 
d. Between cultural recognition and empowerment 
Charles R. Hale proposes the strategy under Neoliberal multiculturalism for 
indigenous people in the following terms:  
“…I argue that cultural rights movements have little choice but to occupy the 
spaces opened by neoliberal multiculturalism, and that they often have much to 
gain by doing so; but when they do, that we should assume they will be 
articulated with the dominant bloc, unless this decision forms part of a well-
developed strategy oriented toward resistance from within, and ultimately, toward 
a well-conceived political alternative.”109 (Emphasis mine) 
Hence, it is important to look at the “spaces opened by neoliberal 
multiculturalism” in Bolivia; how these spaces where occupied by Indigenous Peoples, 
and how by occupying them, new alternatives of political-economical-juridical and social 
systems are brought forward.  
e. Reappropriations  
“Puede darse una inadecuación entre imágenes territoriales y territorio; en esta 
inadecuación está la clave del proceso constitutivo de la conciencia territorial. Lo 
que importa en la territorialidad es la vivencia social del territorio.”110 
The Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA) in Bolivia is an example of how 
indigenous peoples movements occupy the spaces opened by neoliberal-multiculturalism. 
Marcia Stephenson describes this Bolivian NGO as a counterpublic sphere in which  
“…(P)arallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
                                                
108 Ibid., 4. 
109 Hale, «Does Multiculturalism Menace?», 522. 
110 Prada Alcoreza, Territorialidad, 16. 
 60 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs…What 
distinguishes the indigenous counterpublic sphere from other contestatory publics, 
however, is the importance of territorial demands and the struggle to achieve 
autonomy and self-determination.”111 
For the author, autonomy and self-determination in Bolivia, become important, 
salient, topics from the mobilizations that took place in 1990 when eastern lowland 
indigenous peoples marched to La Paz demanding “Territory and Dignity”. This 
mobilization “encapsulated the complex historical dimensions of the indigenous 
movement by calling for the right of indigenous peoples to be treated with dignity and 
respected for their historical, cultural, and political specificities.”112 THOA endeavors 
where, principally, the following: The “…(E)laboration and expression of Andean 
cultural identities by collecting and circulating historical, political, and testimonial 
documents disseminated mainly in bilingual (Aymara, Spanish) publications, videos, and 
radio programs or radionovelas”113; secondly, they helped to: 
“…(O)rganize and promote the movement to reconstitute the Andean community 
structure known as the ayllu. It is the fundamental social organization loosely 
based on kinship groups and communally held territory that encompasses lands 
located in a variety of ecosystems…The geopolitical movement to reconstitute the 
ayllu calls for recognizing colonial territorial boundaries between communities 
and reestablishing traditional Andean forms of governance.”114 
Finally, “On the international front, THOA’s work is increasingly grounded in the 
wider transitional indigenous movement, a growing Indian rights network that recognizes 
“both the current limits of purely domestic attempts at democratization and the potential 
for grass-roots leverage through “acting globally”.”115 
The hypothesis from which THOA started was that:  
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“…(D)espite the ongoing history of colonialism and repression, an autonomous 
indigenous historical memory and subjectivity persisted through the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. This native historical memory was fundamental to 
indigenous resistance to intensifying efforts by the radicalized working class to 
assimilate Indians as campesinos and by the MNR to transform Indians into 
acculturated mestizos…The oral histories collected confirmed both the existence 
and the magnitude of indigenous organization.”116 
Through this reappropiation, THOA stressed the importance of identity and land, 
“…members insisted on the significance of identity and land as interlocking elements 
vital to the dialogics of an oppositional Andean cultural politics. In this context, the ayllu 
or traditional Andean community acquired critical symbolic value because it 
encompassed three basic characteristics: “población, gobierno y territorio”.”117 Territory 
and Identity, hence, become the axes that ordered and structured THOA political 
struggles. 
6. IF MUHAMMAD WON’T COME TO THE MOUNTAIN THEN THE MOUNTAIN MUST 
GO TO MUHAMMAD 
The first indigenous march “Por el Territorio y la Dignidad” that headed from 
Trinidad to La Paz began with 300 indigenous marchers of the Bolivian oriental low 
lands. This milestone march, which is known for bringing forth and articulating the 
indigenous as a political force in Bolivia’s recent history, was not initiated by the 
Quechua or Aymara Nations, but by the indigenous peoples that García Linera portrayed 
in Venezuela’s Forum as a minority among the indigenous movement: the selfish, 
individualistic, corporative indigenous opposed to the organic Plurinational Hegemony 
project. 
The march, in its process towards La Paz, and through the discourse of territory 
and terriotoriality, opened a contentious space in which all indigenous peoples could fit. 
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Therefore, the Indígena identity, is re-shaped and re-appropriated by the indigenous, on 
the move, in the perilous hike towards Bolivias’ 12,000 ft. elevated capital.  
“En este sentido, en la marcha desemboca un largo proceso de formación 
organizativa, discursiva e identitaria de los pueblos indígenas de tierras bajas, a la 
vez que se convierten en un hito fundamental en la reelaboración de las redes de 
asociación prácitca, en el imaginario colectivo y en la autoidentificación de los 
pueblos inígenas.”118  
This march, organized by the CIDOB, was grounded in the particular realities of 
the eastern lowland indigenous peoples, and channeled in accordance with these. 
“Territory and Dignity” served as an overarching umbrella for indigenous movements in 
Bolivia, but as Ernesto Noe accounts:  
“En el año 1990, los pueblos indígenas marchamos para conseguir nuestros 
territorios indígenas, ya que en cuatro puntos muy importantes del departamento 
del Beni los terratenientes tomaron nuestras tierras, por lo que pedimos al 
Gobierno que nos reconozca nuestros terrotrios usurpados.  
El Gobierno no hizo nada por nosotros, por lo que decidimos marchar a La Paz. 
El territorio indígena era una cosa muy extraña para el Gobierno de ese entonces, 
del Presidente Jaime Paz Zamora. Tuvimos que convencerlo que tener terriotrios 
indígenas no contradecía la Constitución Política del Estado, sino que estaba 
enmarcado dentro de la misma. Debatimos, y al final de cuentas el Presidente 
entendió nuestra realidad y nos dotó de territorios indígenas.”119 
Territory was a strange, unfamiliar discourse for all audiences in Bolivia, not just 
the government. But, for the eastern lowland indigenous, land and territoriality have been 
at the marrow of their contentious relations with the diverse state “experiences” 
throughout the colonial and civilizational project. 
Among the pueblos that conform CIDOB and which mobilized in 1990, were the 
Chimanes, Moxeño and Yuracaré, habitants of the then called “Parque Nacional del 
Isiboro y Sécure”; a new legal figure which, under the military regime in 1965, 
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prohibited the settlement of new colonizers within the borders of the Park. The National 
Park was already a territorial experience, in which the indigenous peoples of the region 
contested with the state, regarding land and territoriality. The Pacto Militar Campesino, 
the agreement by which the indigenous peoples were incorporated into the state framed 
the relations of indigenous peoples and the modern Bolivian state. Land, and land tenure, 
therefore becomes a site/space of/for citizenship to indigenous peoples, for example the 
Chimanes, Moxeño, and Yuracaré, that with a blow of a law, became in 1965 the 
legitimate/lawful/rightful settlers of Park for the state. 
7. LEGITIMATE/LAWFUL/RIGHTFUL 
The National Park Isiboro y Sécure (now TIPNIS) was established in the 
territories in which the pueblo Moxeño (principally at the northeast), the pueblo Yuracaré 
(to the southeast) and pueblo Chimanes (northeast) lived. This single law puts forth a new 
contentious arena in which land and territory become the loci of indigenous and state 
relations through which citizenship is contested; the (re)creation of the space and its 
logic, comprised between: 
“Por el Norte, parte del hito tridepartamental de La Paz, Beni y Cochabamba, abra 
de Marimonos y a seguir por el curso de los ríos Natusama y Sécure hasta la 
confluencia de éste con el Isiboro. 
Por el Sud, por el curso de los ríos Yusama e Isiboro hasta la confluencia de éste 
con el río Chipiriri. 
Por el Este, de las Juntas del río Chipiriri por la cuenca del río Isiboro hasta su 
unión con el río Sécure junto al Puerto Gral. Esteban Arze. 
Por el Oeste, mediante las aguas divisorias de las Cordilleras del Sejeruma y 
Mosetenes.”120 
Who are the peoples in this contentious space? 
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8. MINIMAL PORTRAITS 
The location where the TIPNIS is now found, was inhabited since before the 
conquest, as some archeological remnants show, by indigenous populations organized in 
complex systems that included canals and farming techniques:  
“Los abundantes restos arqueológicos (extensos sistemas de canales y lomas 
artificiales con cerámica) reconocibles hasta hoy en toda la llanura y en las lomas 
de los ríos dan una idea de la prosperidad de las culturas…prosperidad que dio 
lugar a los mitos del Paítiti (una versión meridional de El Dorado).”121 
Therefore, current indigenous groups at TIPNIS, such as Moxeños, Chimanes and 
Yuracaré, are believed to be direct descendants from those pre-conquest indigenous 
civilizations. Even though there are signs of expeditions from outsiders to the region, 
both from the Inca Nation and the Spaniards, it is not until the second half of the XVII 
century that the space was colonized by outsiders:  
“Los intentos de reducir las diferentes etnias de los llamados indios de Moxos no 
fueron exitosas hasta la segunda mitad del siglo XVII cuando los jesuitas 
comenzaron a contruir sus misiones, en total 26, en toda la llanura de Mojos…”122  
The introduction of religious missions, transformed the relations that indigenous 
peoples had to space, therefore, to politics, economy, culture, society, and life: 
“Los jesuitas instituyeron una forma de organización sociopolitica que permitía 
un mayor control de la población indígena, los llamados “cabildos”. Sus 
funciones básicas apuntaban a la organización de la mano de obra indígena en el 
sistema productivo misional y a la estructuración del ritual católico…Aún hoy en 
día en las comunidades del TIPNIS con fuerte presencia de población mojeña, el 
cabildo y sus autoridades, se encargan de organizar el trabajo communal y las 
festividades religiosas y en ellas el cabildo constituye la maxima instancia de 
decisión a nivel comunal.”123 
The mission system introduced new dynamics, while concentrating indigenous 
peoples through the missions; it also provoked, on the other hand, dispersion among 
                                                




others that fled from them. Therefore, indigenous populations fled from the more 
accessible zones of the region, to inaccessible inland zones of it: the same space becomes 
re-discovered, therefore re-defined. 
In 1767, the Jesuits were expelled and as new regional economic interests emerge, 
such as the rubber economy in the north of what is now the states of Beni and Pando, 
indigenous groups abandon the spaces where missions where established, since the 
missions economic system was on decay. 
a. Pueblo Chimanes 
The Chimanes: “…(H)an desarrollado una estrategia de supervivencia cultural 
caracterizada por el rechazo al proceso de concentración y reducción en misiones y por 
retirarse a zonas cada vez más inaccesibles…”124 
This among other characteristics, made this group a society structured around 
extended kinship with an extended and flexible occupation of the space, which is related 
to the lack of centralized and located overarching political structures:  
“…(D)e manera que no han creado jefaturas o cacicazgos y en virtud a lo cual el 
jefe de familia es también el jefe politico o Konsasiki. Cabe destacar que en éste 
sistema se suma el Chamán o Kukuitzi, quien representa autoridad por la relación 
que tiene con lo sobrenatural y su función está centrada en velar por la identidad 
cultural del grupo.”125 
b. Pueblo Moxeño 
The Moxeños, are descendants from the Arawak, and it’s the outcome of a 
process of: “…etnogénesis en las reducciones misionales jesuitas de Moxos…”126 This 
group, since its relation to the Jesuit missions, incorporated into their imaginaries 
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religious, and western elements: “Los moxeños trinitarios del TIPNIS son herederos de 
una rica tradición misional que tiene expresión en sus patrones arquitectónicos…, en el 
culto religioso moxeño y sus manifestasiones asociadas…y en toda la tradición artesanal 
de los oficios misionales.”127 This relation is made manifest by the Loma Santa myth:  
“Una mañana de invierno…Pedro Cuevo se levantó de su hamaca, acomodó sus 
exiguas pertenencias, llamó a su esposa, hijos y a una treintena de vecinos y les 
dijo que había tenido una vision que le indicaba cómo llegar a la Loma Santa. Sin 
pensarlo dos veces el grupo emprendió el camino por el bosque tras los pasos de 
su líder. Luego de varios días el buscador se detuvo en un sitio cercano al río 
Isiboro y les dijo as sus compañeros: “Aquí podemos criar a nuestros hijos”. 
Bautizaron el lugar como Santísima Trinidad y decidieron quedarse.”128 
This pueblo, compared to the Chimanes and Yuracaré, possess a distinguishable 
productive and social capital: Cabildos are still part of their organization to the present 
day and are structured in communities; other productive crafts, such as ranching and 
manufacturing are present as well, remnants of the Jesuit economy structure. 
c. Pueblo Yuracaré 
As the Chimanes, the Yuracaré rejected the Jesuit Mission system, by organizing 
through  
“…(L)azos de parentesco consanguineo y de alianza, constituyéndose la familia 
nuclear en la base de una red de relaciones, que empieza agrupando de dos a cinco 
familias hasta llegar a un número que asegure la autosuficiencia para la 
producción y subsistencia del grupo.”129 
 Residency, therefore is: 
 “…(T)anto patrilocal como matrilocal y neolocal, cada familia nuclear es celosa 
de su independicia, aunque compartan una misma localidad o asentamiento. En lo 
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que hace a su organización socio-político, no reconoce jefe único para todo el 
pueblo, con autoridad centralizada.”130 
d. Settlers 
In colonial period and as Cochabamba developed as an urban hub, the first 
settlements were established at the south part of the TIPNIS, a region full of potentialities 
because of its extension, natural resources and low population. But it’s not until 1905 that 
colonization was State bounded, organized and ordered by public policies, which “… 
(T)uvo su expresión en los procesos de ocupación del Chapare por población de 
horizonte cultural andino (Aymara and Quechua indigenous peoples) y que se manifiesta 
con mucha fuerza a partir de la década de los 60 (sic) del siglo pasado.”131 These 
settlements are characterized by the introduction of the planting and production of the 
coca leaf, characteristic of the Andean ecosystem:  
“En el caso de la zona Sur del TIPNIS, la construcción de un tramo del camino en 
los años 70 (sic) hasta el asentamiento yuracaré de Moleto dentro del entonces 
Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, facilitó el aumento de la colonización. Esta se 
acelera a partir de 1978, sobretodo en el periodo de auge de la producción masiva 
de coca (1980 a 1987) –que convirtió a la región del Chapare en la de mayor 
producción de coca en Bolivia- y con la crisis de la gran minería y la 
relocalización asociada a los mineros. El espacio ocuapdo por la población colona 
dentro del área protegida (delimitado por una “línea roja”) abarca unos 92.000 ha 
del territorio (alrededor del 7%).”132 
e. Criollos 
Although a minority group, organized throughout 25 cattle ranches in the TIPNIS, 
these criollo populations, principally from Beni State, occupy more than 32,000 hectares, 
with extensions that go from “…(E)ntre menos de 100(hectares) hasta más de 5 mil 
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hectáreas.”133 These group is observed since the 1970’s, and in their ranches, they employ 
the indigenous workforce. 
Table 2 TIPNIS Inhabitants according to different census 134 
Indigenous Population Settler Population Total 
Population 
Year/Source 
Inhabitants Communities Inhabitants Unions  
1990-
INCOFOR 
5154 53 13159  18313 
1992-
CIDDEBENI 








  7905 40  
1994-Hoffman   9758 48  
1997-PDM 
Villa Tunari 
  10653 42  
2001-INE National Census; TIPNIS by Municipality: 
San Ignacio de 
Moxos 
2127 23   2127 
Loreto 637 7   637 
Villa Tunari 1227 14 6354 47 7581 
Total 3991 44 6354 47 10345 
All of these civilizations, intermingled, in a fixed space, through different 
historical eras, through different power technologies (state, family, missions, community, 
religion, land and territory) couldn’t be a better example of the abigarrado concept, of 
Bolivia as that…conflictiva articulación de desigualdades y formas de superposición 
desarticulada. Within the TIPNIS borders, through its abigarrada composition, and 
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amidst power relations from different civilizations, Modernity through the articulation of 
technologies is deployed and enforced. 
9. PLURISPATIAL COMMUNITIES WITHIN 
The indigenous pueblos within the TIPNIS are organized in communities, a term 
used in multiple ways throughout different spaces between the three pueblos:  
“El concepto de “comunidad”, al tiempo que cada vez tiene mayor peso en la 
percepción local, engloba muy diferentes modalidades de identidad y una amplia 
tipología de formas de ocupación del espacio, desde puestos familiares con no 
más de diez personas, a poblaciones en torno a una posta y escuela con hasta 250 
habitantes pasando por asentamientos de familias extensas. Los más grandes 
(entre 200 y 250 habitantes) son Santísima Trinidad, Buen Pastor, San Antonio de 
Ismose, Natividad, Gundonovia y San Pablo.”135 
Relations among Moxeños, Yuracaré and Chimanes, reflect as well, their social 
systems in which mobility and migration throughout the space are fundamental. These 
three groups through the occupation of different spaces in the region, in migration cycles, 
have fostered relations among them, establishing family as well as political ties. 
“Como consecuencia de esta amplia movilidad especial, en la mayoría de los 
casos la conviencia de los tres pueblos se manifiesta en la ocupación de los 
mismos asentamientos. Históricamente las relaciones interétnicas entre los tres 
pueblos han estado mediadas ideológicamente, y en gran medida lo siguen 
estando por una suerte de “jerarquización” cultural –moxeños, yuracarés, 
tsimanes, en este orden– que han adquirido algunos rasgos de discriminación, 
especialmente a nivel de la organización política, pero que en los procesos reales 
de ocupación del espacio se han resuelto desde formas de convivencia y en un 
creciente porcentaje de matrimonios interétnicos. De este modo, el TIPNIS 
aparece como un espacio donde es possible discernir con claridad tres culturas 
indígenas diferentes pero al mismo tiempo se manifiesta en su globalidad como 
un espacio multicultural.”136  
Therefore the political for the indigenous peoples within the TIPNIS is structured 
throughout different, and not continuous, temporal and geographical paradigms. The 
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journey through discontinuous geographies -plains, foothills and highlands- in the 
TIPNIS, and the incorporation and (re)appropriation of myths, such as the Loma Santa 
(“…Es la Loma Santa donde queremos vivir. Este territorio no nos lo han regalado por 
cariño. Fue una búqueda de muchos años de nuestros abuelos. Ellos han recorrido todo el 
Beni buscando oun lugar adecuado para vivir en paz y armonía con la naturaleza y con 
Dios.”137), which is given different meanings in different historic eras, breaking the 
linearity of time, are at the core of the political. Citizenship is given on the move, through 
the circulation of geographies and time, in confrontation among civilizations. 
10. PLURISPATIAL COMMUNITIES BEYOND 
On 1982, the recently founded Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente 
Boliviano (CIDOB) served as a turning point for the pueblos within the TIPNIS. Even 
though the Barrientos decree recognized the territory as a National Park prohibiting the 
establishment of new settlers, these never ceased to happen:  
“En esos años el parque sufrió impactos negativos considerables ocasionados por 
los primeros procesos de colonización, la deforestación y la caza y pesca ilegales. 
A causa de este deterioro, en 1980 el área protegida fue eliminada de la lista 
oficial de parques nacionales y reservas equivalentes de las Naciones Unidas. Los 
indígenas también habían contribuido a eso, pues explotaban los recurso naturales 
y los vendían a intermediarios a precios ínfimos.”138 
Through CIDOB, the TIPNIS pueblos reshaped and reframed their land and 
territory claims. In 1979, the first contacts among indigenous peoples from the Bolivian 
eastern lowlands started to happen, but it was not until 1982 and after creating multiple 
organizations that CIDOB emerged. During these time, an intense and systematic labor 
of: “…(C)rear lazos y unificar criterios entre las ya existentes formas de autogobierno 
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local y regional de los indígenas de tierras bajas…”139 happened. The challenge was 
creating a central organization, throughout discontinuous territories, among different 
indigenous pueblos, with different social structures.  
CIDOB’s structure is grounded in the communities that conform it; these 
communities, as reviewed in the case of Moxeño, Yuracaré and Chimanes, are structured 
in different forms, throughout different geographies. Therefore, the central organization 
of CIDOB is rooted in a flexible concept, that of community. “Las comunidades son 
consieradas por la CIDOB como “la base orgánica y fuerza política de la Confederación. 
Ellas tienen sus propias formas de representación de acuerdo a sus costrumbres y 
noramas consuetudinarias.”140 
This first level of organization, communities, becomes articulated through 
centrales, subcentrales and capitanías which “…(U)nifican por identidad cultural y 
linguística a comunidades que en algunos casos tienen discontinuidad territorial.”141 The 
centrales, subcentrales and capitanías are organized as well through Asambleas or 
Central de Pueblos. At this level, we can observe how ethnicity and territory is 
overcome, in order to place a common eastern lowland indigenous peoples identity, 
therefore the construction of a new indigenous space. CIDOB orchestrates the eight 
Asambleas and Central de Pueblos. 
CIDOB, therefore, is not a state, nor a centralized hub of representation; rather, 
this multi-regional and multi-ethnic space becomes active, and relevant, only as needed 
by the communities. “La fuerza de todo lo que es el movmiento indígena como tal viene 
desde abajo, desde sus bases, que son bases reales. Acá no es el caudillo o el líder 
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sindical el que impone las reglas.”142 Therefore the communities are the ones that support 
CIDOB’s web when needed, meaning that the material needs for enforcing CIDOB have 
to come from the communities as well. As reviewed above, communities are shaped in 
different way, and could be conformed by just a couple of families, therefore, CIDOB 
becomes a space in which the communities are embodied through individuals, 
overcoming as well the lack of volume (eastern lowland indigenous peoples at Bolivia 
are a minority). 
11. MOVING COMMUNITIES 
“Cuando se va a convocar a una marcha, como aquí a la CIDOB, ella hace entrega 
de una convocatoria, y es mediante eso que respalda el capitán y saca fotocopias y 
a cada capitán se le entrega para que ellos con ese documento informen a su base 
y expliquen sobre qué es la moivilización, para qué. Entonces ya mediante eso se 
convoca a una reuniían (sic) para ya designar a los representantes.”143 
Since communities are the ones responsible for activating CIDOB when 
necessary, CIDOB is put forth by the communities’ particular grievances. But through the 
intermediate levels of articulation, these grievances are shared and re-defined, making of 
the Asambleas and Central de Pueblos:  
“…(U)n escenario de cohesion social, de construcción de marcos interpretativos y 
legitimadores de la propia acción colectiva. De ahí que no sea una exageración 
afirmar…la asambela funciona regularmente como un espacio de formación de 
opinion pública y, al momento de la movilización, como un centro de cohesión 
militante entre todos los involucrados, directa o indirectamente, en la 
movilización.”144  
Therefore, grievances in the communities are reinterpreted, and reframed in ways 
in which them could be articulated in an overarching argument for the eastern lowland 
indigenous pueblos.  
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This becomes evident through the main way that CIDOB has engaged with the 
State: marching. Marching, which implies the “…(S)acrificio del cuerpo como lenguaje 
de una exlusión y un sacrificio por el reconocimiento…”145 was first deployed in 1990 
and, as its name implies, it focused on Land and Dignity. 
Land and Dignity, weren’t empty categories, but rather they both encompassed 
pragmatic and symbolic meaning, so much so that the march ended with a Presidential 
Decree by Jaime Paz Zamora, that stated:  
“Se reconoce al Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure como territorio indígena de los 
pueblos Mojeño, Yuracaré y Chimán que ancestralmente lo habitan, 
constituyendo el espacio socioeconómico necesario para su desarollo, 
denominandose a partir de la fecha Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro-
Sécure.”146 
But this local redress for the Moxeño, Yuracaré and Chimanes, was only possible 
through the contestation that CIDOB posed, through its march, to the overall indigenous 
question in Bolivia; by addressing territory, the Bolivian Nation-State had to address the 
indigenous. In 1994, through the reform of the Bolivian constitution, multiculturalism is 
established:  
“…Se reconocen, se respetan y protegen en el marco de la ley, los derechos 
sociales, económicos y culturales de los pueblos indígenas que habitan en el 
territorio nacional, especialmente los relativos a sus tierras comunitarias de 
origen...”147 
 Territory, therefore, is tied to the definitions and redefinitions of citizenship, and 
how to achieve it among different citizen –civilization– projects. 
Therefore, the nine marches organized so far by CIDOB, address local salient 
issues, that redefined by the multiple, becomes salient for all (Table 2). 
                                                
145 Ibid., 234. 
146 Bolivia, «Decreto Supremo 22610», Art. 1. 
147 Bolivia: Constitución Política de 1976 con reformas de 1994 y texto concordado de 1995 Art. 171. 
 74 
 
Table 3 Eastern Lowland Indigenous Peoples Marches 148 
March Date Principal 
Attainment 
Date 
I. Indigenous March for 




II. Indigenous and 




1996 INRA Law 1997 
III. Indigenous March for 
“Land and Territoriality 
and Natural Resources”.  






Decrees as well 
as the enactment 
of new ones.  
2000 
IV. Indigenous March for 
“Popular Sovereignty, 
Territory and Natural 
Resources.  




V. Indigenous March 
“Eastern Bloc: María 
Esther Chiquero 
Picaneré.” 
2004 Creation of the 
Indigenous 
Section in the 
Hydrocarbons 
Law.   
2004 
VI. Indigenous March for 
“Territory, Community 
Redirecting for Land 
Reform Macabeo Choque 
y Bezabe Flores” 
2006 This march was 
in order to 
introduce their 









                                                




Table 3 (continued) 
VII. Indigenous March 
for “Territory, 
Autonomy, and the 










VIII. Indigenous March 
for the “Defense of the 
Indigenous Territory 
National Park Isiboro 
Secure TIPNIS, for the 
Territories, Life, Dignity 
and Rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples.” 
2011 Law No. 180 2011 
IX. Indigenous March in 




the Environment and 
Protected Areas, the 
fulfillment of the 
Constitution and the 
respect to Democracy.” 
2012   
12. THE PLURINATIONAL STATE AND THE SOCIETAL MOVEMENTS 
If we agree with Luis Tapia’s statement that in Bolivia, social and societal 
movements (movements of civilizations) take place, how do the former differ from the 
latter? What is at stake at each kind of movement? How does Modernity cope with each 
of them? We can glimpse, I argue, through the stories and histories of the VIII 
Indigenous March “Por la Defensa del Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro 
Secure TIPNIS, Por los Territorios, la Vida, Dignindad y los Derechos de los Pueblos 
                                                
149 This march is the one referred by García Linera in the above mention Forum in Venezuela.  
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Indígenas” how Modernity, in the limit, is enforced. I argue that, while the seven 
previous marches contested the state and Modernity, it was not until the VIII march that 
the indigenous reached, by opposing a highway, Modernity’s limit, bringing forth the 
mechanisms by which Modernity enforces itself, i.e. repression, criminalization, 
minimization. Violence as an essential feature of Modernity.  
a. Internal Colonialism in Concrete: The Highway 
The main character of Mario Vargas Llosa’s Death in the Andes, a mestizo, 
coastal (as opposed to Andean) Peruvian police corporal, supervising the construction of 
a highway in the Andes ponders: 
“¿Avanzaba esa carretera? A Lituma le hacía el efecto de que, más bien, 
retrocedía. En los meses que llevaba aquí había habido tres paralizaciones y, en 
todas, el proceso se repitió como un disco rayado. La obra se iba a suspender este 
fin de semana o este fin de mes, el goiberno ya había dado a la constructora el 
ultimatum. El sindicato se reunía y los peones ocupaban las instalaciones, se 
apoderaban de la maquinaria y pedían garnatías. Había un tiempo elástico en el 
que no ocurría nada. Los ingenieros desaparecían y el campamento quedaba en 
manos de los capataces y del contador, quienes fraternizaban con los huelguistas y 
compartían la olla común, que se preparaba al aterdecer, en el campo baldío 
medianero entre los barracones. Nunca había habido violencia y el cabo y su 
adjunto jamás tuvieron que intervenir. Las paralizaciones terminaban 
misteriosamente, sin que se dfiniera la suerte de la carretera. La compaía, o el 
representante del Ministerio enviado a zanjar el diferendo se comprometía a no 
despedir a nadie y a pagar a los trabajadores los días de huelga. La obra se 
reanudaba en cámara lenta. Pero a Lituma le parecía que, en lugar de retomarla 
donde había quedado, los peones desandaban lo recorrido. O porque había 
habido derrumbes en los cerros que dinamitaban, o porque con las lluvias los 
aniegos habían destruido la huella y deshecho el afirmado, o por lo que fuera, el 
cabo tenía la impression de que seguían excavando, dinamitando, aplanando o 
echando capas de gravilla y de alquitrán en el mismo sector que trabajaban 
cuando él llegó a Naccos.”150 (Emphasis Mine) 
Vargas Llosa, through his main character, questions the indigenous incapacity of 
linearity through the highway as a metaphor. The highway serves him as a metaphor that 
                                                
150 Llosa, Lituma en los Andes (Esenciales), 77–78. 
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connects time, the uncivilized past, opposed to the civilized future, and space, the 
disruption of the Andean indigenous isolation. Therefore, as the highway fails to be, the 
indigenous remains stagnant in time and space.  
Different projects regarding a highway connecting the states of Cochabamba and 
Beni through the TIPNIS have been considered through different periods of time. Despite 
being pointed out as a priority by different governments, it’s not until 2003 that Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada (Goni), through the Presidential Decree No. 26996 declared the 
complition of the “…(R)ed Fundamental de Carreteras el Tramo comprendido entre las 
localidades de Villa Tunari y San Ignacio de Moxos, localidades pertenecientes a los 
Departamentos de Cochabamba y Beni respectivament.”151  
This decree is enforced through Evo Morales’ Law 3477, from 2006, in which it 
is declared “(D)e prioridad nacional y departamental la elaboración del Estudio a Diseño 
Final y construcción del tramo Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos, correspondiente a la 
carretera Cochabamba-Beni, de la Red Vial Fundamental.”152 Consequently, since a 
national priority, Evo Morales signed in 2008 with former Brazil President da Silva and 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, in Riberalta Bolivia, two agreements for the 
construction of the so called “North Corridor” that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans by linking Brazil and Peru through Bolivia, framed on the regional development 
agenda carried out by IIRSA. But Brazil’s credit only is involved with the highway 
project through the TIPNIS: 
“Por su parte, el crédito de Brasil se ejecutará en dos fases de acuerdo con el 
protocolo suscrito por los presidentes de Bolivia, Evo Morales y de Brasil, Luis 
Inácio Lula Da Silva. En el documento se detalla que el primer tramo está 
compuesto por Rurrenabaque - Santa Rosa con una extensión de 95,7 kilómetros; 
Santa Rosa - Australia con 169,4 kilómetros y Australia - El Choro con 168 
                                                
151 «Decreto Supremo No 26996», Art. 2. 
152 «Ley No. 3477», Art. 1. 
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kilómetros. La construcción de estos tres sectores demandará una inversión de 
199 millones de dólares, bajo un financiamiento en términos preferenciales por 
parte del Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social (BNDES). El 
segundo tramo está compuesto por la ruta El Choro - Riberalta con 74,9 
kilómetros y una inversión de 31 millones de dólares de carácter concesional por 
parte del Programa de Financiamiento a las Exportaciones (Proex), administrado 
por el Banco de Brasil.”153 
This protocol is legalized in 2010 with Law 005 in which “(A)pruébase el 
Protocolo de Financiamiento suscrito entre el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y la 
República Federativa del Brasil el 22 de agosto de 2009, por la suma de hasta 
$us.332.000.000., destinados al proyecto Carretero Villa Tunari- San Ignacio de 
Moxos.”154 
Therefore, this 190 miles pavement highway which was budgeted on $436 million 
dollars, of which $332 millions would be covered by the Brazilian credit, was scheduled 
to be constructed in three sections, being the second, from Isunta to Montegrande de la Fe 
(which would go through the colonized zone of the TIPNIS and its “core zone”, that is, 
the less colonized section of the space) the contested one by the TIPNIS indigenous 
peoples, settlers, NGO’s, governments, media, politicians, Nation-States, etc. The 
TIPNIS becomes a multiple contested space, by a multiple array of actors, embodying 
different citizen-citizenship projects, in open contention. 
b. Variegated Territory 
Adolfo Moye, ex Subcentral TIPNIS leader stated in 2010, before the open 
conflict phase between them, through the CIDOB, and the Plurinational State regarding 
stage two of the highway project, that: 
“El terriotrio (with the construction of the highway) se deteriorará, la fuente de 
alimento para las comunidades se perderá. Por ejemplo, los tsimanes, a los que no 
                                                
153 «Presidentes firman acuerdo para impulsar el “Corredor Norte”». 
154 «Bolivia: Ley 005», Art. 1. 
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les gusta convivir con otras personas ajenas a su cultura, prefieren mudarse 
cuando empiezan a ser invadidos, tengo la información de que en los últimos 
meses han estado llegando muchos tsimanes a San Borja (…) Con la carretera se 
invadiría el espacio de vida y no veo otro espacio donde puedan encontrar asilo 
las comunidades de tsimanes, yuracarés y (mojeños) trinitarios. Yo veo que no les 
va a quedar de otra alternativa que emigrar a las capitales para que se conviertan 
en indigentes. Para mí eso es genocidio porque la carretera ocasionará la 
desaparción de esos pueblos. Eso es lo más preocuapnte para nosotros; lo 
consideramos un atropello de nuestros derechos”.155 (Parenthesis is mine) 
As this quote points out, different actors through the TIPNIS space are defining 
and redefining territoriality:  
“Hay comunidades que están apoyando la construcción de la carretera porque no 
entienden los impactos que ésta ocasionará. Ellos ya han pasado el proceso de 
fragmentación territorial y por eso estamos viendo la necesidad de bajar 
información a las comuniades mediante folletos y cartillas.”156 (Emphasis mine) 
Since 2010, political divisions among the TIPNIS indigenous associations have 
become more salient as the space becomes more complex as well. Territoriality, and its 
meaning, has shifted not only for indigenous peoples inhabiting the TIPNIS, but for all 
within and abroad. Reformulations of how cultural practices, identity and territory are 
related, i.e. territoriality, are redeveloped as well, as new technologies emerge and 
different natural and human resources become salient; for example with the current 
increase in lithium use.  
A reshuffling of the political alliances regarding these new re-definitions of the 
space and territoriality occurs as well. Three are now the indigenous organizations within 
the TIPNIS. On the one hand, the Subcentral TIPNIS, founded in 1988, it’s the oldest 
organization, and the one that has worked hand in hand with CIDOB since the early 90’s. 
                                                
155 Fundación Tierra, «Estudio de caso No. 2. TIPNIS, la coca y una carretera acechan a la Loma Santa: 
territorio indígena en Cochabamba y Beni.», 281. 
156 Ibid. 
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Both, at the northern (Beni bound) and southern ends (Cochabamba bound) of the 
territory new political associations that dispute the “representation” of the communities 
within TIPNIS, and therefore its resources, have emerged. At the north, the Subcentral 
Secure emerged through conflicts with Subcentral TIPNIS regarding wood and its use. 
On the southern end, CONISUR emerged, an organization that: 
“…(G)enera desconfianza entre los indígenas, incluso de las comunidades 
sureñas. Ello se debe a que la Gobernación de Cochabamba apoyó la creación de 
esta organización, supuestamente, para consolidar el territorio departamental hasta 
la ribera del rio Ichoa…”157  
Likewise, colonizers, since coca growers, are organized in seven stations and 52 
unions (these settlements, since illegal, are not part of the Indigenous land regime, 
therefore, its parceled, making possible to trade it or sell it, contrary to the rest of the 
territory), allied to the Federación del Trópico de Cochabamba, the cocaleros’ union 
from which Evo Morales is still leader.  
It is worth noting at this moment that the current strategy of Evo Morales 
regarding the highway is articulated through CONISUR and the Federación, as multiple 
sources point out:  
“El exprefecto de Cochabamba y exviceministro de Régimen Interior, Rafael 
Puente, aseveró este jueves que el Consejo Indígena del Sur (Conisur), que exige 
la anulación de la Ley de Protección del TIPNIS (Territorio Indígena Parque 
nacional Isiboro Sécure) y la construcción de la carretera Villa Tunari-San 
Ignacio de Moxos por el corazón del Isiboro Sécure, es parte conformante de las 
Seis Federaciones de Cocaleros del Trópico de Cochabamba, del cual el Primer 
Mandatario, Evo Morales, es su máximo dirigente.”158 
 Or,  
“El presidente del Estado, Evo Morales, acogió como su ahijado al bebé de una 
marchista del Consejo Indígena del Sur (Conisur). La ceremonia católica se llevó 
                                                
157 Ibid., 272. 
158 «Exprefecto dice que CONISUR está afiliada a Federación cocalera de Evo | eju.tv». 
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a cabo en el coliseo Julio Borelli, donde los caminantes se hospedan en La Paz, 
donde llegaron para demandar la construcción de la carretera Villa Tunari – San 
Ignacio de Moxos.”159 
All of these elements, and others that go beyond this research, are immerse at the 
VIII Indigenous March in which land and territoriality, again, plays a crucial role as a 
space where citizenship is defined and redefined.  
c. Variegated Marches 
On the 15th of August 2011, exactly 21 years after the first Indigenous March for 
the “Dignidad y el Territorio”, the VIII Indigenous March “Por la Defensa del Territorio 
Indígena, Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure TIPNIS, por los Territorios, la Vida, Dignidad 
y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía Boliviana”, 
departed Beni’s State Capital Trinidad, demanding in first place, the immediate cessation 
of any highway activities - from research and design to its construction- and the 
annulment of all the regulations regarding the highway. Also, the march brought forth 
different issues that went from land and territoriality to health, education, and public 
policies concerning the state’s environmental agency; through particular grievances from 
the communities, overarching grievances for the eastern lowland indigenous peoples are 
articulated.  
Through the annulment of all the norms regarding the highway project, CIDOB 
sought to insert the indigenous peoples in the re-definition of territoriality and space, not 
to exclude them, or the space, from the debate. There was never in CIDOB’s demands the 
cancelation of the possibility regarding “development” and infrastructure projects as 
such, intangibility was not one of the march demands, on the contrary, the highway in 
itself, was not for everybody, the problem but who benefitted from it:  
                                                
159 «Evo Morales apadrinó al bebé de una marchista del Conisur». 
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“Es cierto que a nosotros no nos molestaría una carretera, pero siempre y cuando 
pase por las comunidades. Por donde tratan de hacerla no estamos de acuerdo; 
ellos nomás se van beneficiar: los cocaleros, los madereros (…). La carretera 
tampoco va a pasar por aquí; tal vez (vaya) a Santísima Trinidad, pero las otras 
comunidades quedarán alejadas.” 160 
Contention and conflict emerged rather from issues such as: where the highway 
was supposed to go through and which economic activities it would benefit the better; the 
way that the government overlooked the Constitution as well as multiple International 
Treaties signed by Bolivia (in fact, U.N. Convention on Indigenous Peoples Rights and 
OIT’s 169 Convention are incorporated into Bolivia’s Constitution): 
“Los Estados celebrarán consultas y cooperarán de buena fe con los pueblos 
indígenas interesados por medio de sus instituciones representativas antes de 
adoptar y aplicar medidas legislativas y administrativas que los afecten, para 
obtener su consentimiento libre, previo e informado.”161 (Emphasis is mine) 
As in the seven previous marches, this one also looked for an agreement with the 
government, through the plurinational state, in order to solve their demands.  
“Nosotros como indígenas somos capaces también de analizar los probelmas del 
país, y no queremos crearle problemas al gobierno; más bien nosotros estamos 
ayudanto al gobierno, al señor Presidente, para solucionar los problemas.”162 
The indigenous peoples of the eastern lowlands, aware of their position regarding 
the Bolivian social landscape, a minority within the indigenous, living in discontinuous 
and hard to reach geographies, have always sought the recognition of the state(s), by 
recognizing it as well: 
Queremos enfocarle y ayudarle al gobierno de que poniéndole en conocimiento 
todo lo que tiene como deber, como gobierno, de solucionar; nosotros tenemos 
que ponerle en su conocimiento, esto para nosotros no es ponerle una dificultad, 
                                                
160 Fundación Tierra, «Estudio de caso No. 2. TIPNIS, la coca y una carretera acechan a la Loma Santa: 
territorio indígena en Cochabamba y Beni.», 280–281. 
161 «Declaración de las Naciones Unidas Sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas», Art. 19. 
162 Sociología De Los Movimientos Sociales En Bolivia, 247. 
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no es ponerle una traba, sino asegurarle también que su gobierno pueda ser 
histórico.”163  
This dynamic is rooted in the concrete experiences of the eastern indigenous 
populations, an experience in which oppression and exploitation used to come from 
regional sources (missions, farms and ranches, political caciques, etc.), rather than the 
National State per se. Therefore, relating with the National State, through mutual 
recognition, in order to oppose regional oppressions, fitted with their political objectives. 
If CIDOB was acknowledged, that implied that the communities that make CIDOB active 
where acknowledged as well, brining forth a relation between nations/citizens. In the 
same key, when the State stops making its “job”, the indigenous peoples, through their 
communities, via the individual bodies, are set in motion in order to show themselves, as 
they embody their Nations-Civilizations-Citizenships. 
d. Modernity on the limit: it’s rather you or me 
“…(C)állese porque ahoringa los voy a matar, ustedes estaban a punto de 
matarnos a punto de flecharnos!”. “Si no los matamos nosotros ustedes nos van a 
matar”. “¡Por culpa de indios!””164 
That quote is part of the testimony given by Miriam Yubánore, Vice-president of 
Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni Central, who on the 25 of September 2011 was 
repressed among other marchers part of the VIII indigenous march, by the police and 
military forces of the plurinational Bolivian state. The argument, as depicted on the last 
quote, can be summarized as: if it’s either you or us, it better be us. What does us against 
you represents? 
                                                
163 Ibid. 
164 «Boletín Bolivia Plurinacional: “VIII Marcha Indígena” | Cejis», 11. 
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The VIII indigenous march, unlike the previous ones, was repressed on its way to 
La Paz. The state’s repertoire of violence(s) against the indigenous marchers was, and 
still continues to be, deployed, in order to enforce a citizenship project. 
As quoted before, the leader of the Subcentral TIPNIS stated that the reason for 
the breakup with the plurinational state, came when it broke the structures of the 
communities: “Lo más triste del Gobierno que el mandatario sabe y conoce cómo son las 
estructuras de los pueblos indígenas, porque él viene de una organización social, pero  
las rompe y su relación es directamente Gobierno – Comunidad, es la típica 
representatividad de las empresas petroleras.”165  
Justa Cabrera, spokewoman of the VIII march stated regarding the repression:  
“En la represión de 25 de septiembre hubo abuso físico y psicológico a las 
mujeres, hombres y niños. Algunos niños fueron separados de sus madres que 
todavía seguían amamantando. El Gobierno ha violado las estructuras 
organizativas de nuestras organiaciones así como la Constitución Política del 
Estado y la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los 
Pueblos Indígenas. De acuerdo a este instrumento internacional, el Estado debe 
hacer una consulta previa a las comunidades indígenas respetando su 
institucionalidad, sin embargo este Gobierno no quiso reconocerla, violando de 
esta manera los derechos de los pueblos indigenas.”166 (Emphasis is mine) 
The indigenous leader, in her editorial, points out at the different levels in which 
the violence by the state works: repressed bodies, repressed communities. 
e. Reasons For Violence(s) 
In its report about the events of the 26 of September the Defensoría del Pueblo, a 
public and autonomous institution recognized by the state, collects the multiple accounts 
regarding the repression to the marchers. The violence(s) accounts of the VIII indigenous 
march go as early as the 19 of August 2011, just 5 days into the march in which it is 
                                                
165 «Líder del Tipnis: ‘Respaldo indígena a Evo fue una equivocación’ | eju.tv». 
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reported how a group of cívicos (municipal authorities) from the San Ignacio de Moxos 
municipality which supported the construction of the highway, blocked the marchers path 
to La Paz:  
“Como parte de esta campaña intimidatoria, el pasado viernes alrededor de 150 
personas armadas con palos bloquearon la VIII Marcha Indígena en la localidad 
de San Ignacio de Moxos, y rompieron el parabrisas de la camioneta de la 
Subcentral indígena del TIPNIS.”167 
 At the same time, the Government stated their intentions of dialogue with the 
marchers by sending a commission conformed by different cabinet members; the rhetoric 
of dialogue, by the government, was coupled with delegitimizing the movement and the 
agency of its leaders in the media. Evo Morales, as well as other ministers, pointed that 
the VIII march was organized and funded through USAID, for example:  
“Al mostrar un listado de llamadas telefónicas como supuesta prueba de la 
vinculación de algunos dirigentes de la VIII marcha con funcionarios de la 
Embajada de Estados Unidos, el Primer Mandatario “indígena” confesó que su 
gobierno espía a sus propios “hermanos” originarios, insinuando que son un 
peligro para la “seguridad” del Estado.”168 
The dialogue commission failed after the indigenous leadership  
“…(O)bjetó las seis alternativas que presentó el Ejecutivo para construir el tramo 
II de la vía Villa-Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos, así como la propuesta de ir a una 
consulta pública…El dirigente de la CIDOB (expresó) “no van a partir el 
TIPNIS”.169 
 Therefore, the march continued on its way to La Paz, amidst the opposition of the 
state and multiple groups benefitted from the highway, such as the settlers at the TIPNIS  
“El dirigente de la Federación de productores de la hoja de coca de CARANAVI, 
Juan Cachaca, amenazó con otro bloqueo en la region paceña, si no se consolida 
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Marcha Indígena», 20. 
 86 
el diálogo entre el Gobierno y los indígenas (which would end up resuming the 
construction of the hightway)”. 170(Parenthesis is mine) 
The countermarch organized by municipal authorities and supporters of Morales 
at Yucumo intended to block the way of the eastern lowland indigenous peoples to La 
Paz, becoming the preamble of the repression of the latter by the government. As the 
march got closer to Yucumo, the Police blocked the access of the marchers, arguing for 
the “bigger good” –life- as opposed to other human rights, such as the right to move 
freely. As the police explained to the eastern indigenous protesters:  
“Nuestro objetivo es contener. Evitar, por ejemplo, que continúe la marcha para 
evitar, vuelvo a recalcar, que exista un enfrentamiento”, dijo el coronel Carlos 
Flores, vocero de los policías en el bloqueo… “Los marchistas tienen el derecho 
al libre tránsito. Pero vayámonos a un principio: el bien supremo, el derecho 
mayor, que es justamente la vida. Nosotros debemos anteponer, ante este derecho 
de libre locomoción, el derecho a la vida. Lo que no queremos es que exista un 
enfrentamiento y existan daños a la integridad física, en el entendido de que están 
marchando niñas niños, mujeres embarazadas y ancianos”, dijo el coronel. Vamos 
a contener esta marcha -hasta el último momento- sin el uso de ningún tipo de 
agentes químicos y equipo policial…Nuestro rol es de contención absolutamente, 
es de prevención. No estamos viniendo a reprimir a la marcha, sino solamente a 
contener ¿Sí? Lo que nosotros queremos en este momento es evitar que los 
señores marchistas avancen, porque no sabemos cuál es la reacción de este sector 
(de los bloqueadores)”, recalcó.”171 
On September 24th, and under the tensions between the indigenous march and the 
pro-government countermarch, the event that serves the state as an excuse for repressing 
the indigenous marchers occurs. As a new dialogue committee led by Bolivia’s 
chancellor David Choquehuanca failed, the marchers decided to continue to La Paz. 
Since, the police had blocked the highway, appealing to the integrity of the protesters, the 
indigenous march, “las mujeres, molestas, se llevaron a Choquehuanca para romper el 
cerco policial y avanzar hacia Yucumo.”172 The marchers first front, composed by 
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women, in order to break the blockade, took the Chancellor by the arm and marched with 
him, giving no option to the police, but to let them continue on their way. 
The Chancellor stated that:  
“Nosotros buscamos el diálogo y hemos venido a facilitar esto. No han aceptado y 
ha sucedido esto cuando algunos dirigentes se molestaron y de pronto me 
rodearon las mujeres, han habido amagos y me han forzado a caminar. Yo he 
caminado obligado y casi, casi hubo enfrentamientos", dijo el canciller en 
contacto exclusivo con la televisión. 
Déjenme hablar con los policías para que nos dejen pasar, pero los ánimos estaban 
exaltados. Los dirigentes no sabían qué hacer y después han empujado", relató el 
Canciller. 
Yo voy a seguir intentando que podamos superar esta situación. Vamos a seguir 
haciendo gestiones. Hay preocupación por parte de las organizaciones.173” 
As the report by the ombudsman states, the repression of the 25th of September 
was planned just after the events regarding the Chancellor happened. Different state 
institutions, from the Police, Army and the Executive branch, started to coordinate the 
events to happen on the 25th.  
At 5:30 a.m. on the 25th of September, the Police stroked against the protesters. 
As protesters were repressed, including children, women and elder people, the Police as 
well, started targeting the march “leadership” in order to put them on jail, on the charge 
of abduction of Chancellor Choquehuanca, with the caveat that no warrant was never 
turned in by any judge. This didn’t came until February 2012, when 26 leaders were 
called to declare on the Chancellor’s “abduction”.  
The leadership, abducted by the Police, was about to be shipped in Army and 
Police planes to La Paz, but the protesters took the airstrips en masse, and the Police with 
no other choice but to massacre the marchers or leaving them free.  
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“Si, ellos gritaban y nos trataban que nosotros éramos unos indios de mierda y 
que no respetábamos al Gobierno. -¡Así tienes que respetar mierda, indio de 
mierda, a este Gobierno!- así me ha gritado, vamos a terminar con ustedes 
sabandijas de la tierra, así nos dijo…Un policía me dijo: -¡Este cabrón de mierda, 
este hijo de puta es el que instruyó a su gente y ahora he todavía decís parador y 
como parador le vamos a dar ahora su patada, así me dijo directamente!... Nos 
decían-¡Estos perros indígenas, los vamos a matar!-, de esa manera se expresaban, 
-¡Maten a estos mierdas!-, los agarraban, los llevaban arrastrando, no había caso 
de defendernos, queríamos nosotros defender a nuestros compañeros, nos regaban 
de balines y de gases lacrmógenos…”174 
f. Laws 180 and 222: Regulated Violence’s  
After these acts of violence, which only brought rearrangements at the interior of 
Morales’ government and that still doesn’t cast any criminal liability to any of the 
individuals involved in them, the indigenous march gained new national and international 
visibility and momentum. The march that started with 700 marchers the 15th of August on 
Trinidad by the 19th of October, as they entered La Paz, mobilized over a million 
protesters. Just 5 days later, on October 24, the government promulgated Law 180. 
As the seven previous marches, this one also ended up with a Law regarding the 
TIPNIS; unlike the previous marches, this law didn’t represent a victory for the lowland 
indigenous peoples, especially for the TIPNIS inhabitants, since it declared the TIPNIS 
intangible. Therefore, with Law 180 the highway project was washed ashore, since 
nothing could be done in the space, but the agency of the indigenous within the TIPNIS 
and their use of the space, as well, became regulated by the state: 
“Artículo 3: Se dispone que la carretera Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos, 
como cualquier otra, no atravesará el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional 
Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS. 
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Artículo 4: Dado el carácter intangible del TIPNIS se deberán adoptar las medidas 
legales correspondientes que permitan revertir, anular o dejar sin efecto los actos 
que contravengan a esta natrualeza jurídica.”175 
Opposition to the intangibility of the TIPNIS was immediate and came from all 
fronts, since it held back any kind of activity on it, therefore the government, rooting 
against this unpopular law and through the support of the social movements close to it, 
such as the coca leaf unions and the indigenous organizations dissenters of CIDOB 
within the TIPNIS, as CARANAVI, resolved to appeal to democracy, through a public 
and individual public consultation regarding:  
“1. Definir si el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS 
debe ser zona intangible o no, para viabilizar el desarrollo de las actividades de 
los pueblos indígenas Mojeño-Trinitario, Chimane y Yurucaré, así como la 
construcción de la Carretera Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos.  
2. Establecer las medidas de salvaguarda para la protección del TIPNIS así como 
las destinadas a la prohibición y desalojo inmediato de asentamientos ilegales 
respetando la linea demarcatoria del TIPNIS.”176 
Environmentalism and democracy are used as tools by Modernity to enforce its 
project.  
As Law 222 was enacted, the communities within CIDOB decided to activate it, 
and put forth the XIX indigenous march “Por la Defensa de la Vida y la Dignidad, los 
Territorios Indígenas, los Recursos Naturales, La Biodiversidad, el Medioambiente y las 
Áreas Protegidas, cumplimiento a la Constitución Política del Estado y el Respeto a la 
Democracia”.  
13. POLITICAL VIOLENCE/VIOLENT POLITICS 
The diverse accounts of the TIPNIS conflict evidence the different kinds of 
conflicts as well, within its space. If we read without any context both Law 222 and 
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CIDOB demands regarding the TIPNIS, it seems to be two of the same: both address 
international rights, such as the UN charter of indigenous rights, both appeal to the 
conservation of the natural resources within it, both appeal to the development of the 
population within it, both appeal to democracy, etc. How come the plurinational state, 
leaded by an indigenous president, and the CIDOB, an indigenous organization, could be 
so pitted in their positions? 
Through this partial, subjective and incomplete account of the TIPNIS conflicts, 
I’ve tried to point out at the contradictions within the projects both of the Bolivian 
plurinational State and the eastern lowland indigenous peoples, organized mainly through 
CIDOB. Many facts, not only from this account but also from any historical account, are 
probably missing and therefore, no such thing as the Truth of the TIPNIS conflicts is 
offered.  
However, there is a fact that cannot be denied: the repression through the use of 
violence(s) on the bodies of the marchers’ part of the VIII indigenous march. 
This sole fact, the abused bodies, evidence how Modernity is enforced, in this 
case in the Bolivian plurinational state context. While the previous marches didn’t 
question Modernity, and its civilization and citizenship projects, the State (aka the 
legitimate monopolist of violence) accommodates. But, as soon as the other(s), whoever 
they might be, questions Modernity foundations (i.e. who decides what development is 
and who enforces it) the State represses. 
Therefore, Subcomandante Marcos’ statement about how the Left should be the 
“voice of the death” gains substance.  
In Adiós Muchachos, former Nicaraguan vice president Sergio Ramírez, reveals 
how death and deads became the parameter for the Sandinistas:  
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“El culto a los muertos no fue una orden que nadie dio nunca desde la jerarquía 
revolucionaria, sino la consecuencia de una convicción íntima alimentada con el 
ejemplo …Nunca dejaba la muerte de ser el camino de la purificación absoluta, la 
expiación de toda mancha, sobre todo porque representaba el sacrificio 
deliberado, querido, buscado, chivo expiatorio y cordero degollado, y es por eso 
mismo que la revolución la puso en la cumbre de sus fastos, la conmemoración de 
la muerte como festividad propiciatoria. Y los muertos, tranfigurados por el 
sacrificio, pasaron a integrar el santoral; cada santo, cada mártir celebrado en la 
fecha de su muerte, de su caída. Y en los actos en la plaza, alguna vez empezó a 
aparecer una silla vacía, la de respaldo más alto en el sitial de honor, que era la 
silla de Carlos Fonseca, el jefe ausente de la revolución pero siempre 
presente…La obligación de los vivos era ajustar su conducta a la de los 
muertos… Había que recordarlo siempre…”177 
Through the death and through the violated, oppressed and silenced bodies, we 
could glimpse and understand how Modernity and its civilizational projects, in the flesh, 
are enforced. 
On the other hand, through this research, another salient issue becomes evident. Is 
Modernity as a global civilizational project one in which the other(s) are actually 
possible? The plurinational state in Bolivia, as multiculturalism before, recognized the 
multiplicity in nationalities within the Bolivian space, something that existed regardless 
of its recognition by this or any state.  
Modernity, through the state, enforces its projects in the limits, through violence. 
Therefore violence is essential to Modernity and its enforcement. The contention among 
civilizations is enforced, on the limits through the different repertoires of violence 
available: from physical death: 
“Photographs apparently showing United States soldiers posing with body parts of 
dead insurgents drew strong condemnation on Wednesday from American 
officials… (I)n one photograph, two soldiers posed holding a dead man’s hand 
with the middle finger raised…The revelation of the photographs followed video 
uncovered in January of four American Marines urinating on dead Taliban 
fighters and appeared likely to complicate an already tense atmosphere for 
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American forces in Afghanistan. There is a military investigation under way into 
the burning of Korans at Bagram Air Force base in February, which touched off 
deadly riots. The military is also investigating the killing last month of Afghan 
villagers, including women and children, by a rogue American soldier in 
Kandahar Province, also in the south.”178 
To social death:  
“La marcha de dirigentes políticos es un derecho, no tenemos por qué opinar bien 
o mal, pero…lo que ya no está en juego es el TIPNIS, lo que está en juego no es 
la carretera, lo que está en juego en la marcha es un proyecto político y tienen 
derecho a ser un proyecto político los dirigentes y los activistas, tienen derecho a 
decir que hay un proyecto de derecha que está en marcha y tienen todo su derecho 
de hacer su proyecto político de derecha”, aseguró el Jefe de Estado. 
“Pero no es lo correcto que digan que la marcha es por el parque, porque ya no 
hay empresa para construir la carretera, ya no hay motivo para la marcha, la 
marcha ya no es en función de la carretera o el parque, pero que lo digan con 
valentía, somos de derecha y queremos un partido de derecha, que digan que sus 
verdaderos intereses con el pretexto del parque y como se está dando hasta ahora 
es para un proyecto político de derecha…”179 
Finally, if violence is at the marrow of Modernity, then: does violence is the only 
way to effectively contest Modernity? Does violence becomes a legitimate tool for all 
civilizations on contention? If violence is an inescapable and unavoidable feature of the 
political, can other(s) political projects avoid it, or manage and administer it differently?  
Meanwhile, and regardless of this analysis, the battle for the political amidst 
civilizations in Modernity, embodied in the conflicts happening around the TIPNIS, will 
continue to happen. How violent will this battle be, remains to be seen, although the toll 
as of today remains uneven; as well as in the last 500 years.
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